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NEGLIGENT ACCOUNTING AND THE LIMITS 
OF INSTRUMENTAL TORT REFORM 
John A. Siliciano* 
Instrumental reasoning1 has fueled much of modern tort reform. 2 
In justifying the expansion of liabµity rules, courts seldom rely primar-
ily on the need to correct some perceived injustice visited on an indi-
vidual plaintiff by the alleged tortfeasor. Reform instead is frequently 
defended as a means of furthering broader policy goals, such as creat-
ing incentives to encourage risk creators to take optimal levels of care 
or allocating the costs of accidents to parties better able to shoulder 
such losses. 3 
Using this arsenal of instrumental policy objectives, judicial tort 
reform has enjoyed considerable success in the field. During this cen-
tury, tort reform has overwhelmed most of the barriers - such as 
privity, warranty disclaimer, and the absence of negligence - that tra-
ditionally shielded manufacturers from liability for defective products. 
The sheer relentlessness of this reform impulse, however, raises con-
cerns about whether there may exist some inherent limits to tort's ter-
• Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1975, Cornell. University; J.D. 
1979, Columbia Law School; M.P.A. 1979, Princeton University. - Ed. I thank Gregory Alex-
ander, Jack Barcelo, George Hay, James Henderson, Robert Hillman, Sheri Lynn Johnson, 
Jonathan Macey, Dale Oesterle, Russell Osgood, Stephen Pepper, Richard Posner, Stewart 
Schwab, Steven Shiffrin, Gary Simson, Robert Summers and the participants in a Cornell Law 
School faculty workshop for assisting me with this article. 
1. As used in this article, "instrumentalism" has a dual meaning. On a broad level, it de-
scribes a willingness by some courts to use common law adjudication as a means of solving 
general social problems. In the tort context, this social engineering perspective is reflected in the 
efforts by courts, during the last half century, to reshape liability rules for the express purpose of 
enhancing accident deterrence, improving society's loss-spreading capacity, and compensating 
needy victims. But "instrumentalism" also has a narrower, consequentialist aspect: it refers to 
the assumption by such courts that the means selected to solve social problems - in other words, 
the specific design of the legal rule - will actually prove effective. As this article suggests, the 
second component plainly should inform the first, for if the efficacy of the means-end relationship 
cannot realistically be verified, the aggressiveness with which some courts approach the solution 
of general social problems requires rethinking. For a comprehensive treatment of instrumental-
ism, see R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982). 
2. See Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 184 
(1987). Tort reform, as the term is used in this article, refers to the efforts of courts, and to a 
lesser extent, legislatures, during the last half-century to expand common law liability rules. It is 
to be distinguished from a more recent and opposing reform effort in which manufacturers, phy-
sicians, and various other defendant classes have sought legislative relief from such expansions of 
liability. 
3. See generally Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intel-
lectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). 
1929 
1930 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1929 
ritorial imperative.4 
To assess this issue in a specific context, this article examines a 
recent, pronounced shift in the standard of care owed by an accoun-
tant to third parties who rely on the accountant's audit of another 
party's financial statements. Traditionally, accountants could only be 
sued for negligence by parties with whom they were in contractual 
privity or its functional equivalent. 5 In all other cases, third-party ac-
tions were restricted to claims based on fraud. A more expansive neg-
ligence rule, courts feared, would expose accountants to a degree of 
liability so extreme and indeterminate as to threaten their existence. 6 
In essence, public policy demanded a limit on accountant liability. 
· Recently, however, a number of courts have abandoned the privity 
defense and now hold accountants liable in negligence to third parties 
whose reliance on the accountant's work product was foreseeable. 7 
Such decisions justify the expansion of liability in purely instrumental 
terms; the costs of negligent accounting, like the costs of injuries from 
any other defective product, should be shifted from "innocent" third 
parties to the accounting profession, which through insurance can fur-
ther shift such risks to the "ultimate consuming public."8 Moreover, 
by encouraging accountants "to exercise greater care leading to 
greater diligence in conducting audits," an expanded liability rule 
would serve the "public interest."9 
The significance of this conflict over whether public policy de-
mands a narrow or a broad definition of the accountant's duty of care 
ultimately depends on the success of the instrumental rationales used 
by the reform courts. If the privity rule is seen simply as a vestigial 
remnant of a bygone age, possessing neither theoretical nor practical 
utility, then its rejection by some courts represents a true triumph of 
instrumental reasoning. But if privity retains force in the age of in-
4. See, e.g., Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 
IND. L.J. 467 (1976); Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 
1521 (1987); Schuck, The New Judicial Ideology of Tort Law, in AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND 
THE LIABILITY CRISIS (yl. Olson ed. forthcoming); Stewart, supra note 2. Some potential re.' 
straints on the utility of instrumental rationales in tort law are suggested in Siliciano, Corporate 
Behavior and the Social Efficiency of Tort Law, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1820, 1853·63 (1987). 
5. See notes 25-36 infra and accompanying text. 
6. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931). 
7. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Acct. Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cat. 
Rptr. 218 (1986); Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987); 
Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, 
Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983). This rule change was preceded in a 
number of jurisdictions by less drastic departures from the privity rule. See text accompanying 
notes 42-47 infra. ' 
8. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227. 
9. Rosenblum, Inc., 93 N.J. at 351-53, 461 A.2d at 152-53. 
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strumentalism, either as a component of contemporary tort theory or 
as a practical element of public policy, then the casual ease with which 
it has been jettisoned by the reform jurisdictions raises true concerns 
about the ambitions of tort law. 
In addressing these issues, this article first explores the relationship 
between the accountant and the reliant third party, and recounts the 
mounting judicial hostility to the accountant's traditional privity de-
fense. Next, the article critically examines the arguments that have 
supported traditional privity-based regimes. The third section turns to 
the reform courts10 and tests whether the rationales offered for reform 
justify abandoning the privity requirement. 
Concluding that a convincing case for reform has yet to be made 
and - given the complexity of a properly executed instrumental anal-
ysis - may never be made, the article's final section reconsiders the 
utility of instrumental reasoning as a self-sustaining basis for tort re-
fo_rm. It suggests that, if the negligent accounting cases are any indica-
tion, the viability of tort reforms based on instrumental rationales may 
ultimately depend on how well the outcome in such cases corresponds 
to more traditional notions of fairness between the parties. In situa-
tions where this subtext of fairness concerns yields no obvious answer, 
the analysis suggests that courts armed with an instrumental agenda 
should proceed with considerably more caution than they currently 
exercise. 
I. THE ULTRAMARES DOCTRINE AND THE REFORM COURTS 
A. The Nature of Third-Party Claims Against Accountants 
Accountants perform a variety of services for their clients, but 
their greatest exposure to claims by third parties arises out of their 
auditing function. I I In an audit engagement, an accountant reviews 
financial statements prepared by a client and issues an opinion stating 
whether such statements fairly represent the financial status of the au-
dited entity. I2 If discrepancies or deficiencies are identified, the ac-
10. The label "reform courts" is used throughout this article to refer to the jurisdictions that 
have embraced a full foreseeability of harm test for assessing the liability of accountants to reliant 
third parties. See note 7 supra and notes 48-60 infra and accompanying text. The decisions of 
these courts in the accounting cases are but a small part of the instrumental tort reform move-
ment described in notes 1-2 supra. 
11. See generally Note, Accountants' Liability for Compilation and Review Engagements, 60 
TEXAS L. REV. 759 (1982). For companies whose stock is publicly traded, an audit is a practi-
cal, and - under the federal securities laws - a statutory necessity. Newer, smaller concerns, 
however, do not inevitably use audits, but instead sometimes verify their financial condition 
through Jess rigorous forms of review. See id. 
12. In doing so, the accountant employs procedures adopted by the profession - generally 
accepted auditing standards [GAAS] - to verify the data supporting the statements. Addition-
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countant may either insist on appropriate changes in the financial 
statements or qualify its opinion regarding the statements. 13 
In most cases, the end product of an audit is a short certificate, 
attached to the financials, stating the accountant's opinion that the 
audited statements "fairly present" the economic condition of the cli-
ent. In the first instance, this unqualified opinion serves as an assur-
ance to the client that its own perception of its financial health is valid 
and that its accounting systems are reliable. The audit, however, fre-
quently plays a second major role: it assists the client in convincing 
third parties that it is safe to extend credit to or invest in the client. 
Such third parties fall into several categories. They include enti-
ties, such as banks and major suppliers, that may have significant and 
ongoing relationships with the client. A second group, somewhat 
more removed from the client, might include the client's occasional 
creditors and suppliers as well as significant investors. Finally, if the 
client is a publicly traded company, individual investors who have no 
direct or ongoing relation with the client may rely on the integrity of 
the auditor's report in deciding whether to invest in the client. 
For a variety of reasons, however, the audited financials may pre-
sent a materially inaccurate picture of the client's financial health. 14 
Frequently, a financially troubled client will fraudulently alter its fi-
nancial statements and underlying records in an effort to obtain fur-
ther funds from creditors and investors. The accountant, in auditing 
these statements, may fail to detect the fraud and therefore issue an 
unqualified opinion. Alternatively, a poorly conducted audit may fail 
to detect unintended but material errors in the financial statements. In 
either event, third parties that relied on the misleading statements will 
be injured if the client's economic health deteriorates to a point where 
it is unable to m~et its obligations. 
In seeking redress, injured parties typically can state claims based 
on fraud or negligent misrepresentation directly against the client. 15 
The client's probable insolvency, however, renders such primary 
claims unpromising. 16 The injured third party's focus therefore natu-
ally, the accountant examines the internal accounting systems and controls of the client in order 
to assess the client's capacity, under generally accepted accounting principles [GAAP], to pro· 
duce reliable financial information. See generally PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, AU § 110.Dl 
(Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1987). 
13. See generally A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, AUDITING: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
643-63 (1976). 
14. See generally K. ST. PIERRE, AUDITOR RISK AND LEGAL LIABILITY (1983). 
15. In addition, depending on the circumstances, such parties may have claims based on 
contract or on the securities laws against a defaulting client. 
16. See Minow, Accountant's Liability and the Litigation Explosion, J. ACCT., Sept. 1984, at 
70, 76. If the client has entered a bankruptcy liquidation or reorganization, a tort action by an 
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rally shifts to the accountant, whose unqualified opinion regarding the 
client's financial statements may have encouraged the third party's in-
volvement with the client, and who typically remains solvent despite 
the client's demise. 
Third-party tort claims against the accountant generally fall into 
two categories. The plaintiff may seek to assert a claim based on 
fraud, alleging that the accountant knowingly assisted the client in 
concealing its true financial condition.17 Fraudulent behavior involv-
ing intentional misconduct by the accountant towards the plaintiff has 
never been insulated by a privity defense. 18 But if the accountant was 
unaware of the client's perpetration of fraud or if the audit simply 
failed to detect nonfraudulent errors in the client's financial state-
ments, third-party claims against the accountant typically are based 
on a theory of negligent misrepresentation.19 
At this point, the issue of privity comes into play. In determining 
the scope of the duty of care running from the accountant to injured 
parties, courts face several options. Under a strict privity formulation, 
the duty of care owed by the accountant would be bounded by the 
reach of the formal contract with the client. As alternatives to strict 
privity, the duty could be extended to specific noncontracting parties, 
or entire categories of such parties, whose reliance on the accountant's 
work product was actqally foreseen by the accountant. Even more 
broadly, the scope of duty might be defined to encompass all those 
whose reliance was merely foreseeable, rather than specifically fore-
seen. The choice among these alternatives raises important policy 
concerns. 
B. The Ultramares Doctrine 
The first significant judicial inquiry into the appropriate scope of 
the accountant's duty of care toward reliant third parties appeared in 
Chief Judge Cardozo's 1931 opinion for the New York Court of Ap-
injured third party will, if successful, result only in an unsecured claim against the debtor. See 11 
U.S.C. § 507 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). In the context of a bankruptcy, of course, the prospects of 
full recovery on such a claim are very limited. 
17. The exact scienter requirements for such actions vary among jurisdictions. Most tradi-
tional jurisdictions have allowed such third-party actions if either an actual intent to deceive or 
gross inattention sufficient to raise an inference of fraud is shown. See Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 
179, 174 N.E. at 444. 
18. See, e.g., Ultramares, 225 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. 
19. Such claims are occasionally framed in terms of professional malpractice rather than 
negligent misrepresentation, but there appears to be no practical difference between the two. See 
Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1563 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 775 (1988); 
Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 
(1982). 
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peals in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche. 20 The defendant accounting firm, 
Touche, Niven & Co., was engaged by Fred Stem & Co. to audit a 
yearly balance sheet. Touche was aware that Stem, a capital-intensive 
importing concern, would use the balance sheet in its business dealings 
with creditors, investors, and suppliers. To this end, Touche supplied 
Stem with multiple copies of the completed financial statement. At-
tached to the statement was Touche's certificate noting that "said 
statement, in our opinion, presents a true and correct view of the fi-
nancial condition of Fred Stem & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 
1923."21 
While the certified balance sheet showed a healthy company, Stem 
was in fact insolvent. Stem's management had concealed this fact by 
creating fictitious assets, and Touche's rather superficial audit had 
failed to uncover the fraud. Using the certified balance sheet, Stem 
obtained numerous loans from Ultramares Corporation; many of these 
loans remained outstanding when Stem was ultimately declared bank-
rupt. Ultramares, thwarted by the bankruptcy from directly recover-
ing its losses from Stem, turned to Touche, and asserted claims based 
on both fraud and negligence. 
Cardozo confronted these claims during a period of profound up-
heaval in tort doctrine. His earlier decision in MacPherson v. Buick 
Motor Co. 22 had considerably chilled tort law's brief flirtation with 
contractual privity as a general basis for defining duty,23 and had in its 
place proposed foreseeability of harm as the chief determinant of tort 
liability. Yet, the transition was incomplete, for courts remained ap-
prehensive about the vastly expanded tort liability that might flow 
from embracing the foreseeability norm in all contexts. Reflecting this 
fear, a number of doctrines worked to deny liability even in some cases 
where harm was plainly foreseeable. Among the most important of 
these doctrines was the exclusion of claims based purely on economic 
loss.24 
In Ultramares, these strains collided. Cardozo readily acknowl-
edged the foreseeability of harm arising from a defective audit. "The 
defendants,'' he observed, "knew ... that in the usual course of busi-
20. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). 
21. 255 N.Y. at 174, 174 N.E. at 442. 
22. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
23. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109 (Ex. 1842). Although Winterbottom's 
privity rule was widely accepted in American jurisdictions, see J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, 
THE TORTS PROCESS 652-53 (2d ed. 1981), the New York Court of Appeals had begun, prior to 
MacPherson, to limit its scope. See, e.g., Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351 (1870); Smith v. Devlin, 
89 N.Y. 470 (1882). 
24. See generally text at notes 69-93 infra. 
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ness the balance sheet when certified would be exhibited by the Stem 
company to banks, creditors, stockholders, purchasers or sellers, ac-
cording to the needs of the occasion, as the basis of financial deal-
ings. "25 However, the very satisfaction of MacPherson's foreseeability 
criteria simply highlighted the potential that this formulation of the 
liability standard had for visiting extensive and purely economic losses 
on a negligent accountant. For if, as Cardozo observed, "[t]he range 
of the transactions in which a certificate of audit might be expected to 
play a part was as indefinite and wide as the possibilities of the busi-
ness that was mirrored in the summary,"26 then the nature of losses 
arising from a defective audit was likely to be equally diverse and far 
flung. In short, Cardozo confronted a critical choice between acceding 
to tort's expanding reliance on the foreseeability test or restricting lia-
bility by creating an exception to that general approach. He chose the 
latter. 
With respect to the fraud claim, Cardozo recognized that tort lia-
bility might extend beyond the contractual relationship to encompass 
third parties where the accountant knowingly sought to deceive those 
injured or where the audit was conducted so poorly that the accoun-
tant could have no honest belief in the validity of its conclusions. 27 
Where the claim was based on simple negligence, however, Cardozo 
reasoned that a narrower scope of duty was n~cessary. Conceding that 
Touche's audit was "so imperfect and perfunctory" as to breach a 
duty to the client to act "with the care and caution proper to their 
calling,"28 the court nonetheless held that "the ensuing liability for 
negligence is one that is bounded by the contract, and is to be enforced 
between the parties by whom the contract has been made."29 
An opposite rule, the court feared, m1ght "expose accountants to a 
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class," thereby creating a burden "so extreme as to en-
kindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty 
that exposes to these consequences."30 Nor, the court reasoned, was 
the implication of such a duty necessary to protect third parties. "We 
doubt," noted Cardozo, "whether the average business man receiving 
a certificate without paying for it and receiving it merely as one among 
a multitude of possible investors, would look for anything more [than 
25. 255 N.Y. at 173-74, 174 N.E. at 442. 
26. 225 N.Y. at 174, 174 N.E. at 442. 
27. 225 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. 
28. 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. 
29. 255 N.Y. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448. 
30. 255 N.Y. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444. 
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legal protection against outright fraud]."31 Finally, the court rejected 
an analogy between a negligent audit and a defective product. Recog-
nizing that with respect to the latter "[t]he assault upon the citadel of 
privity is proceeding ... apace,"32 the court nonetheless concluded 
that the differences between the harm caused by a defective product 
and that resulting simply from "the circulation of a thought"33 were 
sufficient to justify retention of the privity doctrine in cases of negli-
gent misrepresentation. 
The privity rule of Ultramares, however, was not absolute. The 
court reaffirmed its prior decision in Glanzer v. Shepard, 34 in which a 
purchaser of beans was allowed to recover in negligence from the pub-
lic weigher used by the seller. Recognizing a duty of care on the part 
of the weigher toward reliant third parties was appropriate under such 
circumstances because the "end and aim of the transaction" was to 
provide information to the purchasers, even though the weighers were 
reimbursed by the bean sellers. 35 "The bond was so close as to ap-
proach that of privity, if not completely one with it."36 No equivalent 
relationship existed, however, between an accountant and "the inde-
terminate class of persons who, presently or in the future, might [rely] 
on the audit."37 Thus, while actual foresight of reliance by a specific 
third party might displace privity as a trigger for liability, the mere 
objective foreseeability of such reliance would not suffice to establish 
an accountant's liability in negligence for economic losses suffered by 
reliant third parties. 
C. The Assault Resumes 
The Ultramares decision dominated judicial thinking for the next 
thirty years. It reflected a simple, largely intuitive judgment that the 
abrogation of the privity defense might easily impose costs on the pro-
31. 255 N.Y. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448. Indeed, the court feared that the abrogation of the 
privity doctrine would "so expand the field ofliability for negligent speech as to make it nearly, if 
not quite, coterminous with that of liability for fraud." 255 N.Y. at 185, 174 N.E. at 447. 
32. 255 N.Y. at 180, 174 N.E. at 445. Indeed, that "assault" had been launched by Cardozo 
fifteen years earlier in the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 
N.E. 1050 (1916). 
33. 255 N.Y. at 18.1, 174 N.E. at 445. 
34. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). 
35. 233 N.Y. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275. 
36. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 446. Cardozo's reasoning on this point is 
quite unsatisfactory. The bean purchasers were plainly not in contractual privity with the sellers; 
indeed, that is why they constituted "third parties." Rather than attempt to recast the relation-
ship as a privity-based one, the result in Glanzer is better defended by reference to the ease with 
which the defendant weighers could assess and control for the risk their conduct posed for such a 
specifically foreseen third party. See note 108 infra. 
37. 255 N.Y. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446. 
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fession that would exceed the benefits actually realized by reliant third 
parties.38 As time passed, however, several developments challenged 
the rationale of Ultramares. First, the privity doctrine, which New 
York had already rejected in MacPherson as a defense to negligence 
claims for defective products, 39 became extinct nationwide in product 
liability cases.40 As privity disappeared in the products context, its 
retention in the accounting area became - by sheer force of contrast 
- increasingly suspect. Second, instrumental theories of tort reform 
emphasizing the benefits of expansive liability grew more important. 
This growth was reflected in the development of a rich body of schol-
arly literature, judicial dissatisfaction with privity defenses and war-
ranty disclaimers in the products context, and the emergence of strict 
liability as the dominant regime for defective products. 41 
Thus, in the late 1960s, courts42 and commentators43 began chafing 
at what appeared to be the increasingly outdated restraints imposed by 
the Ultramares decision. 44 This dissatisfaction initially took the form 
of expansive interpretations of the Glanzer exception to the privity re-
quirement. Some courts, as well as the drafters of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, relaxed Glanzer's insistence on a specifically fore-
seen and identified third party and found Ultramares inapplicable 
when the plaintiff was a member of a "foreseen and limited" class of 
38. In noting the negative consequences that might flow from an expanded liability rule, 
Cardozo plainly employed the type of consequentialist reasoning typical of instrumentalism. See 
note I supra. Yet, at least in Ultramares, Cardozo rejected the more central characteristic of 
instrumental tort reform: the belief that judges, through modification of liability rules, could and 
should address broad social problems. Instead, as discussed below, Cardozo placed substantial 
emphasis on the value of private ordering and, failing that, on the primacy of the legislature as 
the instrument of reform. 
39. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
40. R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 425 
(1984). 
41. See generally Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. 
REV. 681 (1980); Priest, supra note 3. 
42. See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968); Aluma Kraft Mfg. 
Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 383-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). 
43. See, e.g., Besser, Privity? -An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third 
Parties, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 507 (1976); Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibil-
ities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. REV. 31 (1975); Solomon, Ultramares Revisited: A Modern 
Study of Accountants' Liability to the Public, 18 DE PAULL. REv. 56 (1968); Weiner, Common 
Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 223 (1983); Comment, Auditors' Responsibility for Misrepresentation: Inadequate Protec-
tion for Users of Financial Statements, 44 WASH. L. REV. 139 (1968). 
44. Indeed, some courts and commentators have suggest~ that a simple "Awe for Cardozo" 
preserved privity in the accountants context while it crumbled elsewhere. See International 
Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Acct. Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 812, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 221 
(1986) ("That the 'citadel' has not been breached, insofar as certified public accountants' liability, 
may well be due to the reputation of the distinguished author of Ultramares. "); Shugrue, Audit-
ing the Auditors, TRIAL, June 1977, at 31; Weiner, supra note 43, at 236 n.9. 
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reliant third parties.45 Other courts amended Glanzer's "end and aim" 
restriction so that a claim could be maintained as long as the supplying 
of information to a third party was "one of the ends and aims" of the 
audit.46 A few courts pushed further, altogether abandoning the "end 
and aim" restriction of Glanzer in favor of recognizing a duty to any 
actually foreseen third party.47 
None of these formulations, however, directly challenged the no-
tion that liability was inappropriate in cases where the accountant had 
not actually foreseen reliance by some reasonably identifiable third 
party. Yet, defining duty in a way that turned simply on the pre-
science of the defendant appeared to some commentators a hard line 
to hold. Why, the question seemed to be, should an accounting firm 
be absolved of liability simply because it was subjectively ignorant of 
the objectively foreseeable harm its negligence might impose on third 
parties? Unable to find a ready answer, tort commentators urged that 
the accountant's duty of care be expanded to encompass third parties 
whose reliance was merely foreseeable rather than actually foreseen.48 
This expansion came in the 1983 decision of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 49 a case now widely hailed 
as the heir-apparent to Ultramares. 50 Touche again played the role of 
45. See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. at 93. See also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS§ 552 (1977) (limiting plaintiff class to "the person or one ofa limited group 
of persons for whose benefit and guidance [the accountant] intends to supply the information or 
knows that the recipient intends to supply it"). 
46. White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 362, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319 (1977) (emphasis added). 
See also Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & 
Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 436 N.E.2d 212 (1982). 
47. See, e.g., Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). 
48. See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 43, at 252 ("The placing ofliability on the fortuitousness of 
whether the name of the bank is disclosed or whether a class of lending institutions were known 
to the accounting firm may be a comfortable line to be drawn by those preparing the Restate· 
ment, but it does not appear to rest upon sound analytical considerations."). See also Rusch 
Factors, 284 F. Supp. at 91 (dicta raising the question of expansion of liability to include foresee-
able parties); Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins., 514 So. 2d 315, 321 (Miss. 1987) 
("In fact, there is no reason to prefer a foreseen user over a foreseeable user .•.. "). 
49. 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983). 
50. See, e.g., Recent Developments, Rosenblum v. Adler: CPAs Liable at Common Law to 
Certain Reasonably Foreseeable Third Parties Who Detrimentally Rely on Negligently Audited 
Financial Statements, 70 CoRNELL L. REv. 335 (1985) [hereinafter Recent Developments, 
CPAs]; Recent Decisions, Tort Law - The Enlarging Scope of Auditor's Liability to Relying 
Third Parties, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 281 (1983); New Jersey Developments, Rosenblum v. 
Adler: The New Jersey Supreme Court Expands Accountants' Liability, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 161 
(1984); Comment, The Citadel Falls? - Liability for Accountants in Negligence to Third Parties 
Absent Privity: Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 348 
(1985); Comment, Adjusting Accountants' Liability for Negligence: Recovery for Reasonably 
Foreseeable Users of Financial Statements, 13 BALT. L. REV. 301 (1984); Recent Developments, 
Torts -Accountants' Liability-An Independent Auditor Who Furnishes a Financial Statement 
Owes a Duty to All Those Whom the Auditor Should Reasonably Foresee as Recipients of That 
Opinion; One Who Is Not in Privity with the Auditor But Who Relies on Such Statements May 
Recover in Negligence, 29 VJLL. L. REv. 563 (1983); See also authorities cited in note 43 supra. 
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the hapless accountant, once more having failed to detect fraudulent 
entries in the financial statements of another fiscally moribund client, 
Giant Stores Corporation. When Giant's fraud was discovered and it 
entered bankruptcy, the plaintiffs, who had relied on the financial 
statements in agreeing to merge with Giant, sued Touche for negli-
gence. On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court framed the issue in 
broad, instrumental terms: "[T]o what extent," queried the court, 
"does public policy justify imposition of a duty" on accountants to-
wards third parties who foreseeably rely on the accountant's work?51 
In answering this question, the court drew on themes dominant in 
prior judicial departures from Ultramares. 52 "Why," the court began 
rhetorically, should privity remain a bar "when no such limit is im-
posed ... on liability for defects in products ... ?"53 Concluding that 
the manufacturer of a defective product and the author of an unquali-
fied auditor's opinion are both "impliedly holding out that the product 
is reasonably fit, suitable and safe,"54 the court found the analogy to 
products liability law persuasive. Thus, through use of the products 
analogy, the Rosenblum court depicted its decision as a long overdue 
alignment of doctrine rather than a bold departure from tradition. 
Pursuing the analogy, the court concluded that abrogation of the 
privity requirement would further the same instrumental policy ratio-
nales that supported the expansion of liability rules in the defective 
products context. First, increasing the accountant's exposure to liabil-
ity might "cause accounting firms to engage in more thorough re-
views."55 Similarly, an expanded scope of duty would compensate the 
"innocent creditor or investor" while shifting the risk of a negligent 
audit "to the one responsible for the loss."56 Such loss shifting, of 
course, raised the spectre of financial ruin that preoccupied Cardozo in 
Ultramares. But the Rosenblum court concluded that accountants 
could guard against such burdens simply by purchasing malpractice 
But see Ebke, In Search of Alternatives: Comparative Reflections on Corporate Governance and 
the Independent Auditor's R,esponsibilities, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 663 (1984). Note, H. Rosenblum, 
Inc. v. Adler: A Foreseeably Unreasonable Extension of an Auditor's Legal Duty, 48 ALB. L. 
REv. 876 (1984). 
After this article was accepted for publication, an excellent critique of the Rosenblum court's 
approach appeared in the literature. See Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party 
Liability Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295 (1988). Many elements of that analysis parallel 
what is offered here: readers, particularly those interested in an economic perspective on the 
problem, are likely to find Professor Goldberg's article valuable. 
51. 93 N.J. at 329, 461 A.2d at 140. 
52. See, e.g., Rusch Factors, 284 F. Supp. at 93. 
53. 93 N.J. at 341, 461 A.2d at 147. 
54. 93 N.J. at 341, 461 A.2d at 147. 
55. 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152. 
56. 93 N.J. at 351, 461 A.2d at 152. 
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insurance and charging its cost to the client. 57 These insurance costs, 
in tum, could be further dispersed by passing them on to the general 
consuming public. In sum, the court concluded, "[t]he public interest 
will be served by the rule we promulgate this day."58 
Rosenblum's challenge to Ultramares was applauded by most com-
mentators, 59 and has served as the touchstone in other jurisdictions for 
subsequent judicial reassessments of the privity defense. 60 Thus, it was 
with some suspense that the New York Court of Appeals, in the 1985 
case of Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 61 undertook 
to examine the continued validity of its Ultramares doctrine. Yet, af-
ter acknowledging the growing sentiment favoring expanded liability 
rules, the court, with little elaboration, affirmed the continuing validity 
of the Ultramares doctrine. 62 Following Credit Alliance, courts have 
continued to declare themselves for, or against, retention of the ac-
countant's traditional privity defense. 63 
Predictably, the accounting profession has reacted to all this fer-
ment with considerable dismay. 64 But even if this reaction is dis-
missed as the inevitable, reflexive anger any defendant class feels about 
the erosion of its traditional legal protections, the split in authority is 
disturbing itself, for it suggests a potential looseness or indeterminacy 
regarding the proper role of tort law or its ability to achieve its pur-
ported policy objectives. Unfortunately, the analyses offered by courts 
on both sides of the issue seldom consist of more than fiat assertions 
that privity, or its rejection, will further some important instrumental 
goal. The academic press, which currently favors the reform courts, 
offers little more substance; typically, the accountant's privity defense 
is simply labelled as another "citadel" to be stormed, as if that incan-
57. 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152. 
58. 93 N.J. at 353, 461 A.2d at 153. 
59. See note 50 supra. 
60. See International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Acct. Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 
819, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 226 (1986); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 
376, 386, 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (1983). 
61. 65 N.Y.2d 536, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 483 N.E.2d 110 (1985). 
62. 65 N.Y.2d at 545-55, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 439-45, 483 N.E.2d at 114-20. 
63. See, e.g., Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kem & Co., 827 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1987) (following 
Ultramares and Credit Alliance in diversity action under Indiana law); Touche Ross & Co. v. 
Commercial Union Ins., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987) (following Rosenblum); Raritan River Steel 
Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988) (after considering both ap-
proaches, court adopted intermediate, Restatement-based test). 
64. See, e.g., Collins, Malpractice Prevention and Risk Management, J. ACCT., July 1986, at 
52; Collins, Professional Liability: The Situation Worsens, J. ACCT., Nov. 1985, at 51; Gavin, 
Hicks & Decosimo, CPA's Liability to Third Parties: The Risk Is Increasing, J. ACCT., June 
1984, at 80; Minow, supra note 16, at 70. 
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tation of Prosser's classic characterization65 ended all debate on the 
wisdom of marshalling another crusade. 66 
What is called for, then, is a more systematic examination of the 
arguments driving this schism. This article proceeds with such an in-
quiry by exploring the considerations that restrained Cardozo and the 
visions that motivate the reform movement. 
II. THE ARGUMENTS FOR REsTRAINT: ECONOMIC Loss AND THE 
PROSPECT OF PRIVATE ORDERING 
In the richly textured world of contemporary tort scholarship, 67 
Cardozo's justification of a privity defense for accountants seems, at 
. first encounter, both underdeveloped and a bit quaint. Indeed, both 
reform courts and commentators often seem content to treat Ul-
tramares as a timepiece of no enduring significance. 68 Yet, beneath its 
historical patina, the opinion reflects two themes that still influence 
tort law today - the fear of allowing recovery for pure economic loss 
and the advantages of using private ordering as a supplemental means 
of allocating risk. The question, therefore, is to what extent these atti-
tudes should affect the liability rules governing negligent accounting. 
A. The Economic Loss Doctrine 
Foreseeability of harm has served as the touchstone of liability 
throughout much of tort law. 69 Still, under some circumstances, tort 
law resists this instinct, and resorts to fairly categorical limitations on 
liability even when harm is plainly foreseeable. The common law bars 
65. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 
1099 (1960). Ironically, Prosser borrowed the metaphor from Cardozo's Ultramares opinion. 
See 225 N.Y. at 180, 174 N.E. at 445. 
66. See sources cited supra note 50. . 
67. See Schwartz, Directions in Contemporary Products Liability Scholarship, 14 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 763 (1985). 
68. See sources cited supra note 44. 
69. See text at notes 22-24 supra. Indeed, the reform courts in the negligent accounting cases 
all start from the presumption that foreseeability of harm ordinarily forms the basis of tort liabil-
ity. See, e.g., International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Acct. Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 
820, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 227 (1986) ("tort liability should be delimited only by the concept of 
foreseeability"); Rosenblum Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 339, 461 A.2d 138, 145 (1983) ("Gener-
ally, within the outer limits fixed by the court as a matter of law, the reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of the negligent act define the duty and should be actionable."); Citizens State 
Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 386 (1984) ("The fundamental principle ... is 
that a tortfeasor is fully liable for all foreseeable consequences of his act except as those conse-
quences are limited by policy factors."). 
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against liability for fright without impact70 and for failure to rescue71 
provide two ready examples of this curtailment of the foreseeability 
norm. A third example, of more direct relevance here, is tort law's 
enduring reluctance to allow third-party recovery for pure economic 
loss.72 
The exact parameters of the economic loss doctrine are difficult to 
define. 73 Generally sta~ed, the doctrine absolves a tortfeasor of liabil-
ity for purely economic losses suffered by noncontractual parties as a 
result of his negligence. Judicial application of the doctrine, however, 
has hardly been consistent. A string of exceptions, 74 combined with 
the hostility of some courts toward any restrictions on the operation of 
the foreseeability norm, 75 diminish the utility of abstract formulations 
of the economic loss doctrine. It is therefore useful to consider a para-
digmatic case.76 Suppose a driver negligently crashes into an oncom-
ing vehicle in the middle of the only river bridge connecting two 
halves of a city. Resulting damage to the bridge forces its closure. 
Under traditional negligence rules, the driver would be liable for dam-
70. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419 (1969); Mitchell v. Roches· 
ter Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled, People v. Mussenden, 308 N.Y. 558, 10 
N.Y. 2d 239 (1955). But see Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 
(1968). See generally, Henderson, supra note 4, at 515-19. 
71. See, e.g., Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44 A. 809 (1898); Yania v. Bigan, 397 
Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959). See generally Henderson, Process Constraints in Tort, 67 COR· 
NELL L. REv. 901, 928-43 (1982); Landes & Posner, Sa/vars, Finders, Good Samaritans, and 
Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978); Weinrib, 
The Case/or a Duty To Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980). 
72. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); In re Kinsman 
Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). See generally Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The 
Recovery of Economic Lass in American Products Liability, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647 (1977); 
Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 
1513 (1985); Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples of J'Aire and of 
Products Liability, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 37 (1986). 
73. See, e.g., J. HENDERSON & A. TwERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PRO· 
CESS 275 (1987) ("The case law and much of the literature on economic loss are distressingly 
difficult to follow ••.. It often seems that courts are seeking to determine whether in the world of 
Platonic forms the case will be relegated to the room that houses tort cases or the one that houses 
contract claims."); Schwartz, supra note 72, at 38 (difficult to formulate general theory of eco-
nomic toss because "problem . . . is multiform rather than unitary in character"). See also 
Atiyah, Negligence and Economic Loss, 83 L. Q. REV. 248, 265-76 (1967). 
74. See note 82 infra. 
75. Indeed, the California and New Jersey courts that have led the assault on the accoun-
tant's traditional privity defense have been the most vocal in criticizing the restraints placed on 
tort law by the economic loss doctrine. See J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cat. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 
157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979); People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail, 100 N.J. 246, 495 
A.2d 107 (1985). 
76. This bridge closure example is adapted from Dundee Cement Co. v. Chemical Labs., Inc. 
712 F.2d 1166 (7th Cir. 1983); Leadfree Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 711 F.2d 805 
(7th Cir. 1983); In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 825 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968); Nebraska 
Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1984); and Rickards v. 
Sun Oil Co., 23 N.J. Misc. 89, 41 A.2d 267 (1945). 
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age to the bridge and the other car and for injuries sustained by per-
sons involved in the crash. He would also be liable, in most 
jurisdictions, for purely economic harms such as lost wages suffered by 
these "direct" victims of his negligence. 77 
Any analysis driven solely by the foreseeability of harm, however, 
would remain unsatiated. In blocking traffic on the bridge, the negli-
gent driver has directly impaired the flow of commerce between the 
two halves of the city. Southside plumbers will be unable to fix North-
side leaks, and Northside policemen will be forced to forgo their favor-
ite Southside donuts. These short-run economic losses are as 
foreseeable, under any sensible view of that concept, 78 as the physical 
harm and property damage inflicted at the· scene of the accident. 
Nonetheless, under such circumstances, tort law through the eco-
nomic loss doctrine has resisted extending liability to the limits of fore-
seeability for a variety of reasons. 
Most importantly, tort courts and scholars have been concerned 
that allowing recovery for such economic losses would generate exces-
sive levels of liability.79 To be sure, such problems can occasionally 
arise even when the harm in issue is the traditional grist of tort law -
property damage and personal injury. Still, in most cases, this is not 
so; the laws of physics generally limit the degree of physical harm 
caused by a tortious act. 80 The momentum of an economic harm, on 
the other hand, is not so easily dampened. Instead, the impact of the 
original loss is likely to ripple outward to injure more remote parties 
whose economic fate is linked to the original victim. 81 Thus, unless 
77. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 924, 927 (1979). 
78. Rather than appear disloyal to the foreseeability norm, however, courts often justify the 
limitation of liability in such cases on pretextual grounds. See, e.g., Rickards, 23 N.J. Misc. at 
95, 41 A.2d at 270 (economic impacts of negligently caused bridge closure were not "the natural 
and proximate result of defendant's negligence"). See generally Rabin, supra note 72, at 1522-24. 
79. See generally Rabin, supra note 72. 
80. See Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of 
Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 70-72 (1982). 
81. See id. at 72: 
Economic relationships are intertwined so intimately that disruption of one may have far-
reaching consequences. Furthermore, the chain reaction of economic harm flows from one 
person to another without the intervention of other forces. Courts facing a case of pure 
economic loss thus confront the potential for liability of enormous scope, with no easily 
marked intermediate points and no ready recourse to traditional liability-limiting devices 
such as intervening cause. 
(footnotes omitted); Rabin, supra note 72, at 1532-33: 
The careless driver or land occupant can only wreak so much havoc on others; typically, the 
damage is limited to an unfortunate few .... 
. . . By contrast, the problem of widespread economic loss is all-pervasive. The purely 
economic "ripple effects" of careless conduct can occur as a secondary consequence of any 
negligent harm .... 
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recovery for such losses is tethered to some collateral limiting factor 
- such as related physical harm or the presence of a special relation-
ship between the parties82-the unrestrained operation of the foresee-
ability norm might quickly generate extensive levels of liability. 
Courts seldom fully articulate why they fear the widespread liabil-
ity that would result if recovery for economic loss was allowed, but 
several themes appear to be at work in their decisions. As a matter of 
corrective justice, courts seem to view full liability for economic loss as 
potentially disproportionate to the tortfeasor's wrongdoing, 83 particu-
larly when such wrongdoing consists solely of negligence. 84 If actually 
imposed, such liability could financially cripple the tortfeasor, 85 and 
even the prospect of its imposition might deter socially beneficial activ-
ity. 86 In addition, courts invoke a fear of the enormous administrative 
costs of aggregating and processing the damage claims that would re-
sult if recovery for economic loss were allowed. 87 Furthermore, courts 
have tended to view purely economic losses as part of the background 
noise of a complex and integrated economy and therefore have left the 
burden of insuring against such losses on the parties to whom such 
losses originally fall. 88 
82. Both these circumstances constitute general exceptions to the bar against recovery of 
economic losses. See, e.g., George A. Hormel & Co. v. Dahl, 92 Cal. App. 3d 963, 155 Cal. Rptr. 
337 (1979) (recovery for lost wages allowed after damage to plaintiff's plant); Glanzer v. Shepard, 
233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (third party allowed to recover economic losses from defen-
dant because "end and aim" of defendant's contract was to benefit third party). They owe their 
existence not as much to any particular analytical justification as to the fact that they allow 
courts to address some particularly strong claims without embracing the open-ended liability 
that an unrestrained foreseeability test would generate. See generally Rabin, supra note 72, at 
1515-16. 
83. See, e.g., Dundee Cement Co. v. Chemical Labs., Inc., 712 F.2d 1166, 1171 (7th Cir. 
1983) (fear of the "crushing, virtually open-ended liability imposed on defendants if economic 
claims are recognized"); Leadfree Enters., Inc. United States Steel Corp., 711 F.2d 805, 808 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (tort law needs to have "a sensible stopping point in order to preclude open-ended, 
crushing liability on a tortfeasor"); Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 23 N.J. Misc. 89, 94, 41 A.2d 267, 
269 (1945) ("The effect would be to impose a liability entirely disproportionate to the act com-
mitted or to the failure to perform the duty assumed."). 
84. In contrast, when intentional misconduct is involved, the economic losses of third parties 
are more easily recovered. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 533 (1979) (allowing 
third-party recovery based on intentional misrepresentation). 
85. See note 83 supra. 
86. See, e.g., Dundee Cement Co., 712 F.2d at 1172 n.4 (the "flood of new litigation by people 
trying to show that they were specially damaged ... [would cause a] great ... deterrent effect on 
desirable economic activity because of people's unwillingness to be taken to court even if they 
ultimately would win"); Perlman, supra note 80, at 70-71 (courts fear that the prospect of error 
in adjudication of economic loss claims "may inhibit socially useful activity"). 
87. See, e.g., Dundee Cement Co., 712 F.2d at 1172 n.4 ("the burden on the court system 
would be great"); cf Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. 
Rptr. 302 (1977) (rejecting loss of consortium claim because of the administrative costs of 
processing such claims). 
88. See, e.g., Dundee Cement Co., 712 F.2d at 1166 ("[I]n many [cases,] the [result] would be 
to compel legal involvement in inconveniences that most people previously considered inevitable 
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The judicial fear of extensive tort liability is not the only rationale 
for the economic loss doctrine. One subsidiary concern is that al-
lowing recovery for economic loss creates the potential for exaggerated 
- that is, inaccurate - assessments of damages. In the above illustra-
tion, for example, the negligently caused bridge closure would deprive 
Southside plumbers and donut shops of their Northside customers. 
These concerns might nonetheless enjoy a temporary increase in busi-
ness from Southside consumers who otherwise prefer the services and 
products of Northside vendors. Even were this not so, their Northside 
counterparts might well profit from the accident. While these oppos-
ing economic impacts are unlikely to have the symmetry of Newton's 
Third Law~ 89 they still pose problems for tort courts in assessing the 
magnitude of economic loss caused by the defendant's negligent con-
duct. Such courts are accustomed to viewing injury as a much less 
ambiguous event. The loss of an arm or a car or a life generally repre-
sents a unilateral impairment of society's wealth which is easily mea-
sured. 90 But this limited perspective, if extended to cases of pure 
economic loss, presents the danger that courts will overestimate the 
aggregate economic impact of a negligent act by ignoring collateral 
economic gains. 
Another supplementary rationale for the doctrine stems from the 
fear that allowing third-party recovery for the economic losses may 
create moral hazards. In the above example, such problems are 
largely of the ex post variety; parties whose economic misfortunes are 
unrelated to the bridge closure may make fraudulent or exaggerated 
claims in order to recover from the defendant.91 Such moral hazards 
can also, under some circumstances, take on an ex ante character.92 
in a crowded world. . . . The effect ... would be to make a tortfeasor an insurer for the economic 
losses suffered by the people inconvenienced by his negligent action."); cf. Ryan v. New York 
Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y. 210, 216-17 (1866) ("To hold that the owner must not only meet his own 
loss by fire, but that he must guarantee the security of his neighbors on both sides, and to an 
unlimited extent, would be to create a liability which would be the destruction of all civilized 
society."). 
89. Newton's Third Law of Motion, a formalization of earlier work by Galileo, holds that 
every physical action creates an equal but opposite reaction. 8 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA 663-64 (15th ed. 1985). 
90. In addition, with respect to such losses, tort law's perspective is inherently individualis-
tic: the plaintiff's particular claim to be made whole dominates the analysis. See Rabin, s_upra 
note 72, at 1531 n.59. 
91. This seldom presents a problem with respect to personal injury tort claims, since few 
people would leave a preexisting ailment untreated in the hope of someday folding the costs of 
treatment in with those arising from a tortious injury. The same is generally true of property 
damage, although the proprietors of automobile body repair shops might easily provide contrary 
examples. 
92. See note 101 infra and accompanying text. See generally Epstein, Products Liability as an 
Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645 (1985). 
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In such cases, the mere prospect of recovery from another can en-
.courage a third party to relax the care it would otherwise take. 93 
These factors - excessive liability, exaggerated· damages, fraudu-
lent claims, and lower standards of care - in addition to providing an 
underlying rationale for the economic loss doctrine, also outline the 
doctrine in a way that helps illuminate Cardozo's argument in Ul-
tramares. His apprehension about the "hazards" of exposing the ac-
counting profession to liability "in an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class" can no longer easily be 
characterized simply as a bit of raw protectionism.94 Rather, Car-
dozo's decision plainly reflects the economic loss doctrine's broader 
concern about the effective limits of tort law. But because Cardozo 
did not fully develop the analysis, we are left with the question of how 
fully the accounting cases fall within the parameters of the economic 
loss doctrine. 
With respect to the doctrine's central concern about the imposition 
of extensive liability, the accounting cases seem to approximate the 
paradigmatic case sketched above. Although the first tier of victims of 
a defective audit - the creditors and investors involved with a default-
ing client - is somewhat less diverse than the wide range of enter-
prises affected by a bridge closure, the level of losses certainly can be 
just as extensive. Moreover, the harm suffered by such parties can 
continue to ripple throughout the economic community as their rela-
tionships with other parties are disrupted by their disastrous entangle-
ment with a moribund client.95 This certainly was how Cardozo 
perceived the problem in 1931, and the audit plays an even more cen-
93. These ex ante moral hazard problems are not present in many economic loss cases, such 
as the bridge closure cases, because the likelihood of the loss-causing accident is too remote and 
random to form the basis of a strategic decision by a third party to behave in an abnormal 
fashion. See Rabin, supra note 72, at 1525. 
94. See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.I. 1968) ("[T]he decision 
in Ultramares constitutes an unwarranted inroad upon the [foreseeability] principle."); Seavey, 
Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372 (1939) (suggesting that privily 
was an example of temporary protective judicial legislation); Weiner, supra note 43, at 260 ("The 
time has come to [deprive] the negligent accountant of this anachronistic protection."). 
95. To be sure, at some point, such losses are likely to be self-limiting. The client that uses 
the audit to secure loans from creditors and investors typically does not have an infinite ability to 
absorb such funds, and thus third-party exposure will eventually be limited by the client's debt-
handling capacity. Moreover, the usefulness of an audit quickly fades as time passes and the 
client's financial situation inevitably changes. Thus, Cardozo plainly overstates the case in char-
acterizing the losses arising from negligent accounting as "indeterminate" in amount and dura-
tion. This qualification should not be unduly emphasized, however, for courts have routinely 
invoked the rationales underlying the economic loss doctrine in cases where liability would ulti-
mately be self-limiting. For example, the negligent failure of municipal water suppliers to main-
tain water pressure sufficient for fire-fighting purposes has routinely been held to be an 
insufficient basis for third party recovery despite the fact that the number of flammable properties 
in the area might be thought to set a natural outer limit to the resulting destruction. See, e.g .. 
H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928). In such cases, 
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tral role in today's economy.96 Thus, the prime consideration behind 
the economic loss doctrine - the fear of excessive tort liability -
appears present in the negligent accounting cases. 
The second factor favoring application of the economic loss doc-
trine - the potential exaggeration of losses if liability is allowed -
seems less relevant to the accounting cases. To be sure, the third 
party's ill-advised decision to commit resources to an auditor's client 
obviously benefits the client. But the client in such cases is usually as 
negligent as the accountant, if not actively involved in an effort to de-
fraud the third party. Thus, the benefits to the client generated by 
negligent accounting are unlikely to be the sort of neutral, untainted 
gains that might properly be netted against the harm suffered by third 
parties in assessing the aggregate impact of the defendant's conduct.97 
The tendency of tort courts to focus their attention on the loss side of 
the ledger therefore presents no particular problem in the accounting 
context. 
In contrast, the further consideration of the moral hazards raised 
by an expansive liability rule is particularly significant in the account-
ing cases. Obviously, a third party who suffers harm when an audited 
client becomes insolvent has a strong incentive, ex post, to feign or 
exaggerate its reliance on the audit in an effort to recover losses from 
the accountant. Such claims are particularly difficult to test in the. 
adjudicative process because they often consist of nothing more than 
the third party's oral representation that it relied on the audit rather 
than other factors in deciding to deal with the client.98 Moreover, 
even were the fact-finding process infallible, the sheer volume of such 
suits might pressure accountants to settle potentially nonmeritorious 
claims.99 Precisely these concerns have led the Supreme Court to cur-
tail the potential scope of private actions against accountants under 
courts have viewed the extensive nature of the harm as sufficient to justify terminating liability 
well short of the limits of foreseeability. 
96. Most notably, the federal securities laws require most publicly held companies to pro-
duce certified financial statements as part of their mandatory periodic disclosures to the investing 
public. See generally R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 723 (1986). 
97. See generally Note, Protecting the Auditor from Unwa"anted Third-Party Liability: Re-
thinking the Indemnification Issue, 35 SYRACUSE L. R.Ev. 763 (1984). Moreover, by failing to 
prevent the dissemination of inaccurate financial information, a negligently prepared and defec-
tive audit may permit capital investment to flow to inefficient uses. 
98. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 746 (1975) ("Plaintiff's entire 
testimony could be dependent upon uncorroborated oral evidence ..• and still be sufficient to go 
to the jury."). 
99. See Blue Chip Stamps 421 u:s. at 740 (noting that a complaint alleging inaccurate finan-
cial disclosures may have "a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect 
of success at trial"). 
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the securities law, 100 and they similarly militate for application of the 
economic loss doctrine in state law negligence actions. 
More importantly, however, the accounting cases raise the pros-
pect of ex ante moral hazards. In the above example, it is implausible 
to assume that Southside donut shops will relax their competitive ef-
forts on the assumption that a bridge accident will occur sometime in 
the future and provide a convenient scapegoat for any losses. Such 
accidents are simply too random and unpredictable to form the basis 
of before-the-fact strategic behavior. In contrast, the third party in a 
triangular relationship with a client and an accountant already knows 
of the audit's existence and therefore may contemplate blaming the 
accountant for any harms suffered as a result of risks not revealed by 
the audit. Thus, a rule allowing third-party recovery against auditors 
for all foreseeable harm creates incentives for third parties to relax 
their independent efforts to assess and control the risks inherent in 
their dealings with the client. 10 1 
Cardozo's concern about the negative impact of a full foreseeabil-
ity rule thus can be recast quite easily into arguments for limiting lia-
bility under the economic loss doctrine. Indeed, both the case law and 
commentary on economic loss routinely cite Ultramares as a corner-
stone of that doctrine. 102 The reform courts, however, have paid little 
or no attention to the economic loss doctrine and instead have focused 
simply on the foreseeability of harm generated by defective audits. 
And to the extent that such courts and their supporting commentators 
have acknowledged Cardozo's fear of the open-ended liability that a 
foreseeability rule generates, they have been content to offer the stan-
dard bromide of modern tort law: the use of insurance to offset tort 
100. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps 421 U.S. at 740 (denying standing in rule lOb-5 securities 
actions to those plaintiffs claiming that defendant's wrongful conduct caused them not to 
purchase or sell affected securities; standing available only to actual purchasers or sellers); Ernst 
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 & n.33 (1976) (imposing a scienter requirement for 
private actions under rule lOb-5). 
101. In theory, tort law could control such moral hazard problems by viewing the situation 
as one involving joint care and freeing the accountant of liability if the third party took inade· 
quate care. In practice, however, the reform courts have resisted this view and have instead 
sought to characterize all third parties as helpless consumers of the accountant's work product. 
See notes 113-14 infra and accompanying text. While this portrayal may be apt for some third 
parties, most are far more capable of and actively involved in assessing client risk. See text at 
notes 136-41 infra. For such parties, a full foreseeability rule tends to transform the audit into a 
partial warranty of the client's economic solvency, and thus depresses incentives by such parties 
to take independent care. Cf Menzel, The Defense of Contributory Negligence in Accountant's 
Ma/practice Actions, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 292 (1983) (discussing limited availability of con· 
tributory negligence defense against claims brought by client). 
102. See, e.g., Dundee Cement Co. v. Chemical Labs., Inc., 712 F.2d 1166, 1171 (7th Cir. 
1983); Rabin, supra note 72, at 1527. 
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liability. 103 The Rosenblum court, for example, concluded that be-
cause accountants have been able to obtain malpractice insurance 
against claims made directly by their clients, there was "no reason to 
believe" they could not similarly insure against third-party claims. 104 
As others have shown, 105 however, this judicial belief in the universal 
utility and availability of insurance is dangerously misguided. 
Assuming it is available, insurance does little to alleviate the con-
cerns that underlie the economic loss doctrine. The level of liability is 
just as extensive; only the method of payment has been changed. The 
defendant still faces a disproportionate and potentially crushing liabil-
ity burden, and the tort system still faces the heavy costs of aggregat-
ing and processing extensive third-party claims. Nor does the use of 
insurance alter the moral hazards that arise when the accountant is 
made responsible for third-party losses. If anything, insurance tends 
to exacerbate this problem by mooting the third party's potential con-
cern over the accountant's ability to pay for tort damages. 
Moreover, there is little reason to assume that insurance will neces-
sarily be available to cover extensive and highly unpredictable third-
party liability claims. For insurance to operate effectively, an insurer 
must be able with some degree of certainty to project the level of losses 
that can be expected should the audit prove defective. 106 This calcula-
tion is relatively straightforward for third-party creditors where they 
are required under a privity-based rule to guard against their own 
losses. Knowing their precise exposure to other concerns, third-party 
creditors can protect against the prospect of default by reserving funds 
to cover bad debts. This strategy simply represents a form of self-
insurance. 
However, if the accountant or its insurer is forced to cover the 
losses suffered by third parties when a client defaults, the predictive 
process becomes considerably more difficult. Except in a Glanzer situ-
ation, 107 the accountant does not know the identity, number, or finan-
cial exposure of third-party creditors against whose losses, under a 
foreseeability regime, it must insure. 108 It can, of course, attempt to 
103. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) ("[T]he risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and 
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business."). See generally Siliciano, supra note 4, 
at 1832-33. 
104. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 349, 461 A.2d 138, 151 (1983). 
105. See H. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE COURTS 103-04 
(1987); Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 517 (1984); Epstein, supra note 92; Priest, supra note 4. 
106. See Priest, supra note 4, at 1539. 
107. See note 34 supra and accompanying text. 
108. Thus viewed, the Glanzer exception to Ultramares represents an essentially contractual 
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estimate such losses by analyzing its clients' business practices, debt 
structures, and so forth. Nonetheless, the accountant's second-hand 
information about potential third-party losses is almost certain to be 
less accurate and more costly to obtain than is each third party's pre-
cise knowledge concerning its individual financial exposure. 
This kind of informational asymmetry is not only a justification for 
invoking the economic loss doctrine, 109 but it is also a basis for con-
cern about the availability of insurance. If unable to discern the 
number, identity, and characteristics of reliant third parties whose 
losses it must cover, the accountant's insurer i:; likely to respond to 
such uncontrollable uncertainties110 by raising premiums dramati-
cally. Such precipitous rate surges, in turn, may trigger the fatal "un-
raveling" of insurance risk pools, as those accounting firms that can 
best manage and regulate risk opt out in favor of self-insurance. This 
pattern has occurred in other situations where tort liability has ex-
panded rapidly, and anecdotal evidence seems to confirm the begin-
nings of such destructive trends in the accounting area.111 
In sum, the concerns expressed in Ultramares over the negative 
impact of a foreseeability rule for negligent accounting still resonate 
within contemporary tort doctrine. While the rationales of the eco-
nomic loss doctrine may not apply in all respects, neither can Car-
dozo's reasoning be dismissed simply as outdated protectionism. In 
any event, a reading of Ultramares that focused solely on the court's 
fear of the negative consequences of abolishing privity would be in-
complete, for the opinion also offers the seeds of a positive vision of 
arrangement between the parties concerning how to allocate efficiently the losses arising from the 
negligent audit. By requesting status as a foreseen beneficiary of the client's audit, the third party 
avoids the costs of conducting its own audit and obtains protection against auditor negligence. 
Yet the auditor is theoretically able to recapture the benefit thus bestowed by increasing its 
charge to the client. Similarly, its knowledge of the identity and economic exposure of the third-
party beneficiary enhances the accountant's ability to insure effectively against third-party claims 
arising from the audit. 
109. As noted above, the economic loss cases often assume a superior ability by third parties 
to insure against economic losses. See, e.g., H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 
160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928). 
110. The accountant could attempt to control its exposure by disclaiming responsibility to 
reliant third parties, but given the hostility such efforts have met in the defective products con· 
text, the long-run viability of such. a tactic is questionable. See note 153 infra and accompanying 
text. 
111. See generally Priest, supra note 4, at 1521-22. See also H. JAENICKE, THE EFFECT OF 
LmGATION ON INDEPENDENT AUDITORS 4 (2d ed. 1981) (noting sharp premium rise and exit 
of some firms from insurance market); Collins, Malpractice Prevention and Risk Management, 
supra note 64, at 52 Qiability payments by Big 8 accounting firms totalling $180 million in period 
1980-1986 have resulted in insurance becoming unavailable or prohibitively expensive); Berton, 
Small CPA Finns' Liability Rates Soar, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1985, at 6, col. 1 (noting that of the 
dozen insurers that traditionally offered coverage to small and middle-sized accounting firms, 
only three remain in face of liability crisis). 
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how third parties generally are able to protect their interests without 
the full-scale assistance of tort remedies. 
B. Private Ordering and the Products Model 
In Ultramares, Cardozo concluded that abrogation of privity was 
not only dangerous but also unnecessary. Third parties already en-
joyed protection against outright fraud, and the court expressed doubt 
"whether the average business man receiving a certificate without pay-
ing for it, and receiving it merely as one among a multitude of possible 
investors, would look for anything more."112 The message here was 
clear; tort law provided a necessary base level of protection, and any 
additional assurance against loss was properly left to individual efforts 
of the parties. In the contemporary lexicon, Cardozo professed a faith 
in private ordering by third parties as a viable means of controlling the 
risk inherent in financial transactions. 
The reform courts view the situation much differently. The injured 
third party is routinely compared to the helpless consumer of a defec-
tive product, and from this analogy springs a conclusion that tort law 
should take a more aggressive role in protecting third parties from 
negligent accounting.113 Thus, the faith in private ordering is sup-
planted by a resort to foreseeability as a normative basis of tort liabil-
ity. Yet, this tendency to view foreseeability as a "modern" 
categorical replacement for the "antiquated" contractual view embod-
ied in the privity doctrine overlooks the fact that both concepts have 
long shared the domain of tort law.114 Indeed, Cardozo in Ultramares 
was plainly aware of the utility of foreseeability of harm as a determi-
nant of liability, having engineered its triumph over privity in the 
products area fifteen years earlier in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 115 
The question, therefore, is whether Cardozo was correct in concluding 
that adoption of this foreseeability-based products liability model was 
unnecessary in negligent accounting cases. 
Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson provides an obvious starting 
112. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. 170, 189, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931). 
113. See, e.g., International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Acct. Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d 
806, 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 226 (1986) ("It is only reasonable that the same judicial criteria 
govern the imposition of negligence liability, regardless of the defendant's profession."); Rosen-
blum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 341, 461 A.2d 138, 147 (1983) ("Why [should privity remain a 
bar] when no such limit is imposed [for] liability for defects in products ... ?"). 
114. For example, Holmes embraced both the "general principle" that "loss from accident 
must lie where it falls" and the prospect of liability if "a prudent man would have foreseen the 
possibility of harm." o.w. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 94, 96 (1881) .. 
115. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See also Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 
339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928) ("The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be 
obeyed ...• "). 
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point. In that case, Cardozo held that a manufacturer owes a duty of 
care, with "its source in the law,"116 to the foreseeable consumers of 
its product, despite the absence of a contractual relationship between 
producer and consumer. In rejecting the alternative thesis that the 
existence of such an obligation should depend on whether the parties 
were in contractual privity, Cardozo assumed that the ultimate con-
sumer of a defective product would be unable to detect product de-
fects. The product in issue, a car with a defective wheel, was put "on 
the market to be used without inspection by ... customers."117 Thus, 
even if the producer and the consumer were in privity, the MacPher-
son analysis suggests that the consumer's informational disadvantage 
would typically preclude him from bargaining effectively with the pro-
ducer over safety concerns. 118 Under such circumstances, courts 
might (and, indeed, ultimately did) justifiably conclude that, despite 
the presence of privity, the obligations generated by private ordering 
should still be supplemented by an independent legal duty based on 
one party's ability to foresee and avoid inflicting harm on another.119 
· The viability of a privately ordered solution to the problem of risk 
was made even more unlikely in MacPherson because the consumer 
was not in privity with the creator of the risk - the product manufac-
turer. Instead, the product was unilaterally designed and produced by 
the manufacturer, supplied to an intermediary for distribution, and 
ultimately purchased from that intermediary by the consumer. Even 
if the consumer was fully informed, his prospects for directly altering 
the level of risk were significantly limited by the distance and disparity 
of power between the risk producer and the consumer. 
The subsequent landmark decision of Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors, Inc. 120 expressly invoked this concern in concluding that an-
116. 217 N.Y. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053. 
117. 217 N.Y. at 390, 111 N.E. 1050. Indeed, Cardozo distinguished the contrary cases of 
Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351 (1870), and Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494 (1873), as representing 
special situations where the product supplier was aware that the product user would indepen· 
dently inspect that product for defects. 
118. Indeed, much of modem tort theory, in its analysis of the efficiency of various liability 
regimes, similarly posits the existence of a consumer class that is essentially uneducable with 
respect to product risk. Consequently, a contractual solution to the problem of product risk is 
rejected in favor of a system of liability rules that incorporate consumers' unstated expectations 
regarding product risk. See generally Siliciano, supra note 4, at 1823-24. 
119. In the landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 
69 (1960), tort law accepted this proposition in denying manufacturers the ability to use war· 
ranty provisions to disclaim liability for negligence. There, the New Jersey Supreme Court ob-
served that "the ordinary consumer ... cannot be expected to have the knowledge or capacity or 
even the opportunity to make adequate inspection of mechanical instrumentalities, like 
automobiles, and to decide for himself whether they are reasonably fit for the designed purpose." 
32 N.J. at 375, 161 A.2d at 78. 
120. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
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other component of a possible contractual solution to the problem of 
risk - the warranty disclaimer - was ineffective in relieving manu-
facturers of liability arising from defective products. In the court's 
view, the traditional belief that such disclaimers were the result of the 
"free bargaining of parties who are brought together by the play of the 
market, and who meet each other on a footing of approximate eco-
nomic equality"121 must give way to a recognition of the "strong bar-
gaining power and position" of the producer122 and the "gross 
inequality of bargaining position occupied by the consumer."123 
Under such circumstances, the court felt compelled to override the 
outcome of private ordering and impose a duty - an implied war-
ranty of merchantability - based in law.124 
But how well do the concerns underlying the products model and 
the model's rejection of a private ordering solution apply to the negli-
gent accounting cases? Although the reform courts reflexively adopt 
the defective products analogy, Cardozo had a substantial basis for 
placing greater reliance on private ordering. At the outset, it is critical 
to note that accountants are already under substantial pressures to 
perform careful audits. 125 Even absent any liability rules, accountants 
would have a significant economic stake in establishing and maintain-
ing a reputation for conducting good audits. 126 This positive incentive 
works on at least two levels. The typical client, for its own internal 
monitoring purposes, will insist on a careful audit; accountants who 
fail to meet this standard will not be retained. Similarly, accounting 
firms with a reputation for care will enhance the client's prospects of 
obtaining credit on reasonable terms from outside parties. These fac-
tors suggest that accounting firms with an interest in permanence and 
growth will audit with care. 
121. 32 N.J. at 389, 161 A.2d at 86. 
122. 32 N.J. at 389, 161 A.2d at 86. 
123. 32 N.J. at 391, 161 A.2d at 87. 
124. See generally Priest, supra note 3, at 508-09. See also G.E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN 
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 202-03 (1980) (concept of consumer "powerlessness" 
critical to success of strict liability theory). 
125. To be sure, product manufacturers also face incentives apart from tort law to produce 
reasonably safe products. Reputational concerns and contract law requirements, for example, 
create incentives towards safety. See generally Siliciano, supra note 4, at 1838-39. This system of 
incentives, however, is almost certainly weaker than that which encourages accountants to act 
nonnegligently. Product manufacturers are not guided by a strong professional ethic and are not 
regulated by an internal governing body. They face no federal regulation akin to the control that 
the securities laws exercise over accountants. And their ability to produce new products under 
new names allows manufacturers to recover from reputational injury in a way that may be im-
possible for a profession like accounting, in which the actors ultimately have only their reputa-
tion for accuracy to sell. 
126. See generally Fischel, The Regulation of Accounting: Some Economic Issues, 52 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 1051 (1987). 
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A battery of other forces supplements this natural system of incen-
tives.127 Contract and tort law impose a duty of care on accountants 
with respect to their clients.128 Third parties can tie into this protec-
tion by coming within the Glanzer exception to Ultramares. 129 Third 
parties are also independently protected against fraud by the accoun-
tant.130 In addition, the securities laws contain an array of special du-
ties and potential liabilities for the auditors of publicly held 
companies.131 Finally, the accounting profession has, since Ul-
tramares, moved significantly in the direction of detailed and compre-
hensive self-regulation.132 
127. See generally K. ST. PIERRE, supra note 14, at 6-7 ("The auditor currently faces a com-
plex, often hostile legal environment. . . . [T]he possibility of legal retribution appears in every 
audit engagement."). 
128. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931). 
129. See note 34 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, such parties may be able to raise 
contract claims based on a third-party beneficiary theory. See generally E.A. FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS 709-33 (1982); Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party 
Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985). Under the Restatement approach, for exam-
ple, a third party may recover ifit is the "intended beneficiary" of the contract. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 302 (1981). To satisfy this requirement, the third party must show, 
among other things, that allowing it a contract remedy will "effectuate the intention of the par-
ties." Id. Although this remedy is plainly narrower than the tort remedy fashioned by the re-
form courts, such courts pay virtually no attention to the analysis underlying the carefully 
crafted limits on third-party recovery in the contract context. Yet, given the similarity between 
the two areas, it would seem that contract law should inform, if not completely supplant, the 
efforts of tort courts to protect third-party interests. 
130. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. 
131. For example, under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1982), 
accountants are liable to the purchasers of new securities for negligent material misstatements 
and omissions in the audited financial information contained in the registration statement. In 
addition, accountants may be held liable under section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), for fraud or gross recklessness involving securities disclosures. 
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Furthermore, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission is empowered to suspend or bar accountants from practice before the Com-
mission. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1987). See generally Marsh, Rule 2{e) Proceedings, 35 Bus. LAW. 
987 (1980). This is not to suggest that the current configuration of the securities laws provides 
accountants with optimal incentives for care. Such an inquiry lies beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. It may be, however, that the expansive liability authorized under certain provisions of the 
securities laws, such as § 11 of the 1933 Act, creates problems similar to those engendered by the 
Rosenblum court's approach to the negligence standard. See note 145 infra. Yet, even here, the 
securities laws demonstrate a restraint and predictability absent from the approach of the reform 
courts. Under § 11, for example, the plaintiff class, the proof of violation, and the measure of 
damages are statutorily defined in a manner that enhances the accountants' ability to gauge, ex 
ante, its liability exposure. 
132. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is the profession's 
general oversight body. It determines standards for accountant certification, and, through its 
committee system, helps formulate auditing and accounting standards. Most recently, the Audit-
ing Standards Board of the AICP A promulgated a series of statements on auditing standards 
(SASs) that increased accountants' audit responsibilities. The most significant of these new stan-
dards impose on accountants an affirmative obligation to look for financial fraud during the 
course of audits (SAS no. 53) and require disclosure of substantial concerns over whether an 
audited company will remain financially solvent (SAS no. 59). See Guy & Sullivan, The Expecta-
tion Gap Auditing Standards, J. Accr., Apr. 1988, at 36. Of course, one might naturally ques-
tion the efficacy of professional self-regulation, but the fact remains that the accounting 
August 1988] Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform 1955 
Admittedly, significant debate exists over whether such existing re-
straints achieve an optimal level of audit care.133 Yet no one, except 
perhaps the reform courts, assumes that the effect of these incentives is 
trivial. 134 Moreover, the third party is a free-riding beneficiary of the 
care taken by the accountant as a result of these incentives.135 Thus, 
the question asked by the reform courts - whether imposing a duty of 
care towards reliant third parties is necessary to make accountants be-
have carefully - is the wrong one. The more appropriate inquiry in-
stead would seem to be whether third parties desiring additional 
protection above this existing baseline can effectively achieve such a 
result without judicial imposition of a uniform foreseeability 
standard. 136 
Cardozo's affirmative answer to this question draws support from 
important differences between the capacity of third parties in the negli-
gent accounting and defective products contexts to protect their own 
interests. Most third parties in the accounting cases stand in sharp 
contrast to the hapless consumer in the MacPherson and Henningsen 
contexts. Despite the effort of reform courts to portray such parties as 
"innocent victims" of auditing mistakes, in reality these parties typi-
cally are sophisticated commercial creditors who are adept at assessing 
and accounting for financial risk in the transactions they enter. In-
deed, virtually all of the plaintiffs in the reported negligent accounting 
profession's internal oversight is far more rigorous and comprehensive than that exercised by the 
product manufacturing industry. 
133. See generally Connor, Enhancing Public Confidence in the Accounting Profession, J. 
Acer., July 1986, at 76; Mednick, The Auditor's Role in Society: A New Approach to Solving the 
Perception Gap, J. Acer., Feb. 1986, at 70. 
134. See, e.g., Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 384, 335 
N.W.2d 361, 365 (1984) ("Unless liability is imposed, third parties who rely upon the accuracy of 
the financial statements will not be protected. Unless an accountant can be held liable to a 
relying third party, this negligence will go undeterred."). 
135. In this sense, the reliant third party is a classic free-rider. The accountant as a practical 
matter cannot prevent dissemination of its product to such third parties. Moreover, because the 
client and the reliant third party both care about precisely the same thing - the accuracy of the 
financial statements - the accountant cannot tailor the audit in such a way that it serves the 
client's need without incidentally benefitting the third party. 
136. This criterion for justifying the existence or expansion of liability rules - that the par-
ties otherwise cannot collectively optimize their preferences - explains many features of the 
current liability landscape. Consider, for example, the liability of manufacturers for harm arising 
from product defects. If consumers were able to bargain effectively and costlessly with producers 
over product risk, a tort rule assigning liability to manufacturers for product defects would be 
unnecessary. Instead, consumers and producers would negotiate over risk in the same manner 
that they might over factors like price and quality. But because product consumers are generally 
assumed to be incapable of effectively perceiving or bargaining over product risk, the tort system 
supplies an alternate method - a liability rule - that indirectly educates producers about the 
optimal level of product risk. See generally Landes & Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of 
Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 549-50 (1985). See also Siliciano, supra note 4, at 
1823-26. 
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cases are banks, commercial creditors, or trade creditors who, as part 
of their normal course of business, routinely evaluate the probable 
risks associated with contemplated transactions. 
Moreover, in contrast to the product consumer, the sophisticated 
third-party creditor in the accounting cases is in a direct bargaining 
relationship with the primary risk creator- the accountant's client137 
- and is far better able to protect itself against the prospect that the 
client will inaccurately portray its financial condition. A creditor can, 
of course, simply accept the client's representations as to its economic 
health, thus speeding and simplifying the negotiations. In such cases, 
it bears the entire risk that the client's representations are inaccurate 
and that the client's eventual insolvency might preclude any direct re-
covery for losses arising from such misrepresentations. Alternatively, 
the third party can expend resources to improve the veracity of the 
information. It can insist on conducting or financing its own audit, 
thus contractually securing from the accountant direct protection 
against accounting negligence.138 Moreover, a third party can bring 
itself within the Glanzer exception to Ultramares by requesting that 
the client have an audit conducted expressly on the third party's be-
half.139 Finally, the third party can account for the risk by bargaining 
137. In this context, it is critical to note that the accountant's "product" is simply an opinion 
about the quality of someone else's product - the client's financial statements. The third party's 
primary reliance is on these financial statements, since they provide the data on which the third 
party's decision will be based. See, e.g., Uttramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 173-74, 174 
N.E. 441, 442 {1931) (client's balance sheet shown to numerous third parties "as the basis of 
financial dealings"). Thus, the primary risk in the triangular relation between client, accountant, 
and third party is generated by the client, who may provide the third party with erroneous 
information about its financial status in order to obtain needed credit. See In re Interstate Ho-
siery Mills, Inc., 4 S.E.C. 721 (1939) ("The fundamental and primary responsibility for the accu-
racy [offinancial statements) rests upon management."). Therefore, ifthe third party can protect 
itself against such risks in its dealings with the client, then the lack of privity between the third 
party and the accountant becomes irrelevant in assessing the viability of private ordering as an 
alternative means of controlling risk. In this respect, the defective products and negligent ac-
counting cases differ fundamentally, for only in the latter is the potential victim in a direct rela-
tionship with the primary risk creator. 
138. One might argue that this option results in an unnecessary duplication of accounting 
services and that tort law should seek to avoid such a waste of social resources by imposing on 
accountants a generic duty of care on behalf of third parties. But this mischaracterizes the moti-
vation behind independently conducted third-party audits. Such parties already free-ride on the 
accountant's duty of care toward clients, see note 128 supra and accompanying text, and if they 
wish to obtain direct protection against negligence, they can bring themselves within the Glanzer 
exception to Ultramares. Thus, third parties will generally seek an independent audit only if they 
want to improve upon or double-check the client's audit. In thereby generating additional infor-
mation or reducing the risk of error associated with the first audit, third-party-instigated audits 
seemingly fulfill an independent, socially useful role that tort law, through an expanded liability 
rule, may be powerless to improve upon. 
139. Of course, if an audit has just been completed, a third party may be unable to take 
advantage of the Glanzer rule without delaying its transaction with the client until a new audit is 
conducted or without financing its own audit. But such situations do not seem to merit sufficient 
sympathy to require the intervention of tort law. In essence, a third party proceeding under such 
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for special security or improved terms in the transaction.140 
All these options allow many third parties to identify and control 
the primary risk generated by the client. Indeed, from an efficiency 
perspective, it may be particularly sensible to place the burden of tak-
ing such steps on the third party, for it is unquestionably in the best 
position to know how it intends to use the audit and therefore how it 
can best protect itself against imperfect audits. Yet, in the negligent 
accounting cases, third parties forgo such tailored protection and 
choose simply to rely on the free, off-the-shelf auditor's opinions pro-
vided by the client. This is hardly a risk-free strategy, as the negligent 
accounting cases demonstrate, but it is a strategy nonetheless. The 
elective nature of the strategy distinguishes the typical third-party 
creditor in the accounting cases from the presumptively powerless 
consumer in the defective products context. Admittedly, such a party 
might prefer enhanced protection against negligence if freely provided 
by rule of law. But this tells us little; any rational actor prefers more 
security against loss over less security if the additional protection is 
costless. Such protection, however, usually comes at a price, and the 
critical inquiry therefore becomes whether, ex ante, the party is able to 
obtain the level of protection it desires. The typically sophisticated 
creditors in the accounting case could obtain such supplemental pro-
tection against client-generated risk through a variety of means other 
than reliance on a gratuitously provided audit. This fact supports Car-
dozo's implicit conclusion in Ultramares that their unwillingness to 
obtain this protection represents a choice that the law need not 
supplement.141 
For most third parties, then, tort law might sensibly view private 
ordering as a viable alternative to a foreseeability-based negligence 
circumstances has made a calculation that the benefits of dealing immediately with the client 
outweigh the value of the additional protection against negligence that might be obtained by 
delaying the transaction until a new audit can be conducted. This seemingly represents a classic 
business judgment about acceptable levels of risk and return that need not be skewed by the 
intervention of tort law. 
140. See generally Professional Liability-A New Development, 99 N.J. L.J. 356, 356 (1976): 
In the typical commercial transaction, the creditor or investor parting with his money often 
relies on many factors other than a financial statement or legal opinion.proffered by the 
other side. Many investors do not bother with an audit at all, but accept contractual repre· 
sentations and warranties. Others bring in their own accountants and lawyers (with whom, 
of course, they are in direct privity) to conduct the necessary investigations on which they 
rely. · 
141. Indeed, the fact that the third·party plaintiffs in the negligent accounting cases did not 
avail themselves of the alternate risk·reducing strategies discussed above also supports this arti· 
cle's hypothesis that most third parties, when viewing a transaction with a client ex ante, con-
clude that the existing incentives for care placed on the accountant are sufficient to protect such 
third parties' interests, their ex post protestations notwithstanding. See text at notes 125-32 
supra. 
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rule. However, with respect to one class of potential plaintiffs - re-
mote, passive investors in the client's debt or equity offerings - this 
conclusion becomes more problematic. In speaking of "the average 
business man,"142 Cardozo plainly envisioned the sort of sophisticated 
creditor discussed above. But in today's capital markets, an audit is 
often part of a package of information used to attract investors. Some 
investors, by virtue of their size and financial sophistication, undoubt-
edly approximate or surpass the financial sophistication of the "aver-
age business man" of Cardozo's private ordering conception.143 
Nonetheless, others are remote, unsophisticated individuals who lack 
any significant capacity to bargain directly with the client over invest-
ment risk. 
With respect to this subclass of third parties, the defective products 
model is a closer match. The question, therefore, is whether their 
presence as potential claimants144 justifies the reform courts' rejection 
of privity. Arguing against such a conclusion, one might observe that 
the potential deficiency of private ordering in this context is at least 
partly offset by the substantial protection the securities laws provide to 
this group of audit consumers. 145 But this is merely an argument that 
foreseeability need not supplant privity; it does not prove that foresee-
ability should not do so. In other words, might not the approach of 
the reform courts be applauded simply because it is a "better" - that 
is, a more comprehensive, vigorous, and effective - means of control-
ling the risks associated with negligent auditing? Indeed, the central 
thesis of the reform courts is that their handiwork markedly improves 
upon existing doctrine. Thus, without the slightest hesitation, the 
court in Rosenblum Inc. v. Adler declares that "[t]he public interest 
will be served by the rule we promulgate this day." 146 Others have 
142. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 189, 174 N.E. 441 448 (1931). 
143. Cf SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) (differentiating investors' need for 
protection under securities laws on basis of financial sophistication and access to information); 17 
C.F.R. § 230.501 (1987) (defining "accredited investors" in need of less disclosure protection 
under Securities Act of 1933). 
144. Interestingly, such investors seldom appear as plaintiffs in state court negligent account· 
ing actions. Most likely, such investors generally pursue claims against accountants under the 
federal securities laws, with any state law tort claims appended to such actions. See, e.g., Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
145. See note 131 supra. In addition, the concerns underlying the economic loss doctrine 
seem particularly pressing with respect to this class of plaintiffs: their claims are likely to be 
extensive, widely scattered, extremely costly to aggregate, and prone to moral hazard problems. 
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (such problems favor narrow 
scope of implied rights of action under rule IOb-5). See generally note 210 infra. 
146. 93 N.J. 324, 353, 461 A.2d 138, 153. See also International Mortgage Co. v. John P. 
Butler Acct. Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 227 (1986) ("society is better 
served" by abrogating privity). 
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ably chronicled the forces behind this new aggressiveness. 147 The nar-
row question for this article's purposes, however, is whether the prom-
ise is fulfilled in the negligent accounting cases. To answer this, the 
focus now shifts from the considerations that restrained Cardozo to 
the visions that motivate the reform movement. 
III. THE ARGUMENTS FOR ACTION: THE PROMISE OF 
INSTRUMENTAL REFORM 
As noted, the reform courts pay little attention to the rationales of 
the economic loss doctrine or the potential viability of private ordering 
as an adequate supplement to the baseline protection afforded by a 
privity regime. Their efforts instead are devoted to showing that ex-
panding the liability of accountants to reliant third parties will serve 
the instrumental goals of improved deterrence and loss spreading. As-
suming for a moment that Cardozo's arguments for restraint are with-
out substance, this article examines whether the reform movement has 
delivered on this pledge of furthering public policy. 
A. The Deterrence Rationale 
The dominant instrumental rationale for abandoning privity is that 
exposing accountants to third-party negligence actions will provide "a 
financial disincentive for socially unreasonable conduct."148 The de-
terrence model invoked is both simple and classic; imposing accident 
costs on an actor will encourage that actor to take steps to prevent 
accidents that are worth preventing - that is, those accidents where 
damages exceed the corresponding costs of prevention.149 Stated this 
way, the reform courts' application of this model to the accounting 
context seems an easy case; the accountant, if made liable for injuries 
sustained by third parties when they rely on negligently prepared and 
inaccurate financial statements, will naturally seek to reduce the levels 
of such injuries by auditing financial statements more carefully. 
Unfortunately, the reaction of the accounting profession to the re-
form efforts fails to substantiate this behavioral model. Rather than 
simply vowing to audit more vigorously, the profession has con-
147. See Owen, supra note 41; Priest, supra note 3; Schuck, supra note 4. 
148. Weiner, Common Law Liability, supra note 43, at 256. See International Mortgage Co., 
177 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227 ("[S]uch a rule provides a financial disincentive 
for negligent conduct and will heighten the profession's cautionary techniques."); Rosenblum, 93 
N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152 (new rules "may cause accounting firms to engage in more thorough 
reviews"); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 384, 335 N.W.2d 361, 
365 (1984) ("Unless an accountant can be held liable to a relying third party, this negiigence will 
go undeterred."). 
149. For a more detailed discussion of this model, see Siliciano, supra note 4, at 1823-26. 
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sciously devised a number of strategies for limiting liability exposure 
through means other than increasing the level of care. Thus, in re-
sponse to the threat of enhanced liability, accounting firms may limit 
their services to clients with few third-party contacts. 150 Accountants 
may also withdraw services altogether from clients in high-risk indus-
tries, such as those characterized by a high asset base in inventory or 
accounts receivable.151 Similarly, audits may become unavailable to 
enterprises in an early growth phase, where audit risks are generally 
highest.152 Another major tactic embraced by the profession, ironi-
cally, was explicitly suggested by the Rosenblum court; accountants 
concerned over open-ended third-party liability could "expressly limit 
in their certificates the persons or class of persons who would be enti-
tled to rely upon the audit."153 
This apparent belief of the accounting profession that the liability 
threatened by the new rules is best controlled through evasive behav-
ior154 rather than increased audit care necessitates a rethinking of the 
reform courts' deterrence model. Two critical questions suggest them-
selves: why are accountants behaving in this manner, and what are 
the consequences of pressing ahead with an expanded liability regime 
in the face of such conduct? 
1. The Incentives for Liability Evasion 
As previously noted, accountants face substantial incentives for 
care even under a traditional privity regime. 155 Their apparent deci-
sion to respond to the reform courts' efforts through evasive behavior 
rather than through enhanced care seemingly reflects a belief that sig-
150. See Collins, Malpractice Prevention and Risk Management, supra note 64, at 54 ("clients 
who will distribute ... financial statements to multiple third parties should be shunned"). 
151. See Collins, id.; Minow, supra note 16, at 80. 
152. See Minow, id. 
153. 93 N.J. at 351, 461 A.2d at 152. This effort by the Rosenblum court to suggest to 
accountants strategies to evade the court's own holding is perplexing in its own right. Even more 
bafiling, however, is the court's ignorance of its own ruling in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), in which it disallowed a parallel effort to disclaim liability 
for defective products. One suspects that the accounting profession would be well advised to 
place little hope in the long-term viability of this particular strategy. See New Jersey Develop-
ments, Rosenblum v. Adler: The New Jersey Supreme Court Expands Accountants' Liability, 37 
RUTGERS L. REv. 161, 189-90 (1984) (urging restrictive reading of Rosenblum's disclaimer lan-
guage). In the short run, however, the profession has latched onto the strategy of responsibility 
disclaimers with relish. See Collins, Malpractice Prevention and Risk Management, supra note 
64, at 64. 
154. The term "evasive behavior" is used here to describe actions which seek to limit liability 
in a manner other than through increased investments in care. It does not imply that such 
behaviors are illegal. Cf Siliciano, supra note 4, at 1835-40. 
155. See text accompanying notes 125-32 supra. 
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nificant limits exist to the effectiveness of further investments in care. 
These limits may come from several sources. 
First, the accountant's necessary reliance on client input makes 
risk control more difficult than it is in the defective products context. 
Unlike a product manufacturer that designs and manages its own pro-
duction processes, the accountant serves simply as a reviewer of the 
product of another. If the accountant audits more thoroughly, the cli-
ent who innocently errs may be corrected, but will a client tempted by 
fraud be restrained? To some extent, the fear of an extensive audit 
might make such clients more cautious ex ante, but there appear to be 
significant limits to the efficacy of this incentive. The client who falsi-
fies financial information is often driven by fiscal desperation; if its 
financial disclosures are accurate, the third-party credit necessary to 
save the business from failure will not be forthcoming. Faced with an 
overly energetic auditor, the client itself is likely to engage in evasive 
behavior. It may switch auditors, redouble its efforts to fool the audit 
staff, or pursue third-party financing that does not require an audit. 
But it is unlikely to pursue the option, anticipated by the reform 
courts, of telling the truth. 156 Therefore, even if the accounting profes-
sion willingly shouldered its new responsibilities, reform might be 
ineffective. 157 
Second, the labor-intensive nature of auditing may set natural lim-
its on the efficacy of further expenditures on care, even in situations 
where the client is not actively seeking to produce fraudulent financial 
statements. Unlike product manufacturing, where design and manu-
facturing defects are typically remedied through "technological fixes," 
the central device for reducing risk in the accounting context is to 
increase the workhours devoted to the audit. Yet, either method of 
156. See generally Levy, Financial Fraud: Schemes and Indicia, J. Acer., Aug. 1985, at 78. 
157. Indeed, the client's treachery may bestow on the accountant a defense of contributory 
negligence against the actions brought directly by the client against the accountant. See Menzel, 
supra note 101. The implicit economic assumption underlying this defense is that the standard of 
care applied to a tortfeasor (here, the accountant) should be set on the assumption that the 
"victim" (here, the client) is exercising due care. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE EcONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 88 (1987). But when the claim against the accountant is brought by 
a third party, the reform courts completely ignore the potential for client misconduct, and view 
the situation as one in which the accountant alone has control over the probability of accounting 
accidents. If the goal of the deterrence rationale is to encourage efficient investments in care by 
all parties, tort law cannot tolerate this binary view of the accountant-client relationship. The 
audit, although consumed by both client-victims and third-party-victims, is a single, indivisible 
process that cannot be conducted differently for different potential victim classes. Therefore, to 
establish a standard of care for the accountant in carrying out this process, tort law must settle 
on a single view of the caretaking capacity of clients and third parties. In the accounting cases, 
there are strong arguments for adopting a joint care model, for otherwise accountants will over-
invest in care while clients and third parties will have little incentive to make efficient invest-
ments in care. See id. at 88-89. 
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doing so - increasing the personnel or increasing the hours devoted 
to an audit - is likely at some point to increase, or at least fail to 
further decrease, audit risk. If more personnel are deployed on an au-
dit, the risk of error may eventually begin to rise due to increased 
problems of supervision.158 Alternatively, if staffing remains un-
changed while more time is devoted to an audit, a similar increase in 
audit risk will eventually occur as the informational basis of the audit 
becomes stale.159 
A perfectly functioning tort system should, of course, be able to 
adjust for these problems by holding accountants harmless when the 
efficacy of further investments in care is undermined by client miscon-
duct or technological limitation. Yet, this is not the system we have. 
Thus, even if accountants were able to "get it right" in deciding 
against further investments in care, they might legitimately be con-
cerned about whether the adjudicative process would necessarily con-
clude that they had done so. The determination of negligence is often 
dangerously open-ended and subjective.160 These problems are exacer-
bated when the subject of the negligence determination - the auditing 
process - itself involves numerous discretionary judgments.161 This 
concern has led the profession's defenders to complain bitterly that 
courts and juries frequently hold accountants to unrealistic and unat-
tainable standards that effectively force them to act as insurers of the 
businesses they audit.162 
In light of the above factors, the evasive behavior of accountants is 
hardly surprising. Faced with the prospect of a reckless client, a lim-
ited technology, and an error-prone adjudicative process, the profes-
sion might reasonably view the enhanced liability imposed by the 
158. As anyone acquainted with auditing knows, the process is far from mechanical. In· 
stead, modern audits of complex enterprises require accountants to make numerous judgments 
about the proper characterizations of the data and the reliability of the client's accounting sys-
tems. Although the GAAS and GAAP standards channel the inquiry somewhat, a large subjec· 
tive element inevitably remains. See Connor, supra note 133; Mednick, supra note 133. 
Moreover, such discretionary judgments are often made, in the first instance, by relatively junior 
members of the accountant's field staff. Effective supervision of their work therefore becomes a 
critical part of maintaining audit integrity, see K. ST. PIERRE, supra note 14, and this oversight 
function obviously becomes more difficult as staffing is increased. 
159. The principal component of audited financial statements is a balance sheet, which con· 
stitutes an economic snapshot of an entity's assets, liabilities and net worth as of a given day. 
See, e.g., text accompanying note 21 supra. These components are in constant flux, and thus the 
value of a balance sheet as a reliable indicator of economic health declines as the time between 
the completion of the fiscal period upon which the audit is based and the completion of the audit 
itself is extended. 
160. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 71. 
161. See Connor, supra note 133; Mednick, supra note 133. 
162. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 16, at 77 (noting "the failure of courts and juries to dis tin· 
guish between an audit failure and a business failure"). 
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reform courts simply as a tax on the activity of accounting. Worse yet, 
it is a tax that to a significant extent appears to operate independently 
of the accountant's level of care. Under such circumstances, the ac-
countant's best practical option - its cheapest means - for control-
ling liability is to curtail operations in areas where the risk of third-
party claims is greatest or where the audit involved poses the greatest 
likelihood of unavoidable errors or client deception. Significantly, this 
is precisely what the profession has set out to do. 
2. The Consequences of Expanded Liability 
Assuming for a moment that the profession's resort to evasive be-
havior is incomplete and that accountants therefore make some in-
creased investments in care, important questions remain over whether 
the reform effort actually promotes the public welfare; for if replacing 
Ultramares with a foreseeability-based liability rule produces safer au-
dits, such a change is also certain to make such audits more costly, 163 
more time-consuming, 164 and less universally available. 165 
If an audit were truly like any other product - a lawnmower, for 
example - these collateral effects of improving safety might not be 
troubling. Because nearly all the benefits166 of a lawnmower are con-
ferred on the owner of the machine, 167 a liability rule imposing on 
manufacturers all foreseeable accident costs caused by the lawnmower 
would, in theory, drive producers toward an efficient level of product 
safety and an efficient level of production.168 A manufacturer would 
163. These increased costs come from at least three sources: (a) the increased costs of com-
mitting additional time and personnel to an audit; (b) the increased costs of insuring against 
potential losses to third parties; and (c) the increased dead-weight costs of creating a "paper 
trail" sufficient to demonstrate audit care in subsequent third-party litigation. See fischel, supra 
note 126, at 1055. Marginal accounting firms may not be able to pear such added cost; their 
demise in tum decreases the availability of accounting services. See text accompanying note 199 
infra. See also Ebke, supra note 50, at 690-91. 
164. See generally Note, Rosenblum v_ Adler: Auditors' Liability for Negligent Misrepresen-
tation - the Explosive Power Resident in Words, 38 U. MIAMI L. REv. 939, 957 (1984). 
165. See text accompanying notes 150-53 supra. 
166. The benefits referred to here are of at least two types. One "benefit" is simply the value 
of the manufacturer's investment in safety, which the tort system perceives as lowered accident 
costs. This benefit (i.e., cost avoided) can presumably be fully captured by the tort system, since 
it represents a reduction in the tort liability the producer must initially bear and ultimately pass 
on to the consumer. Another benefit, of central importance here, is the value, apart from safety 
concerns, that the use of the product bestows on the consumer and others in society. As dis-
cussed below, this type of benefit may not be fully captured and weighed against product-related 
costs if the consumer does not value the benefit that the product bestows on third parties. 
167. To be sure, the owner's neighbors might benefit from the sight of his well-trimmed lawn, 
but the owner recaptures these benefits in terms of increased status and civic pride. Otherwise, 
some rational homeowners, this author included, might forgo the pleasure of lawncare. 
168. This effect on levels of production assumes a strict liability regime for defective prod-
ucts, as a negligence standard does not in theory affect activity levels. See LANDES & POSNER, 
supra note 136, at 543; Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980). 
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incorporate such accident costs, along with related safety costs, into 
the lawnmower's price, and consumers would purchase the 
lawnmowers so priced as long as they expected a stream of benefits 
from owning a lawnmower that exceeded its costs. In such cases, the 
fact that an expansion of liability rules - for example, a shift from 
privity to foreseeability of harm as the basis of liability - might de-
crease the number of lawnmowers produced is of no real consequence, 
for it merely indicates that the social benefits of lawnmowers - as 
reflected in what consumers are willing to pay - are insufficient to 
command greater production in the face of fully incorporated social 
costs. 
However, not all risk-creating activities take place in closed sys-
tems where all social benefits and costs can be captured and balanced 
in discrete purchasing decisions. A psychiatrist, for example, who 
successfully treats a potentially dangerous patient bestows a benefit 
not only on the patient but on society at large. 169 Such third-party 
benefits are very unlikely to be fully captured by the psychiatrist in his 
fee to the patient.170 If, on other hand, his treatment of the patient is 
negligent, third parties may be harmed. In such an event, tort law 
might, under a foreseeability of harm rule, impose third-party losses 
on the psychiatrist. Yet, such a rule might distort, rather than opti-
mize, the delivery of the psychiatrist's services. Faced with the full 
cost of his activity, but unable to capture the full benefit, the psychia-
trist might simply refuse treatment to patients most likely to endanger 
third parties. Such a result is obviously hard to square with society's 
general interests. 171 
The negligent accounting cases appear to represent a parallel situa-
tion.172 The information embodied in the auditor's report initially 
Indeed, if consumers were perfectly informed regarding product risk, the same efficient result 
would theoretically occur under an opposite, no-liability rule. See Siliciano, supra note 4, at 
1823-25. 
169. The example is from Tarasolfv. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 
P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (holding psychiatrist liable in negligence to third party killed 
by patient). 
170. Difficulty in assessing the degree of danger the patient poses to third parties impairs the 
psychiatrist's ability to estimate the social benefit created by successful treatment. Moreover, the 
socially dangerous patient, unlike the status-conscious homeowner in the lawnmower example, is 
unlikely to care or be willing to pay for the benefits successful treatment might bestow on his 
potential victims. If the psychiatrist is forced to increase the cost of his services in order to cover 
third-party accident costs, some patients at the margin will forgo the psychiatrist's services. 
171. For criticism of the negative social impact of the Tarasojf decision, see Stone, The 
Tarasolf Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists To Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358 (1976); 
Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists To Determine the Effects of 
Tarasolf, 31 STAN. L. REv. 165 (1978). 
172. The problem of encouraging voluntary rescue provides another example of a circum-
stance in which imposing the full social cost of an activity on an actor may discourage socially 
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confers a benefit on the client; the value of this benefit is captured in 
the accountant's fee. But the audit also aids a potentially wide array 
of third parties considering financial transactions with the client. 
Even parties that ultimately decline such involvement profit from the 
audit to the extent that it reduces the uncertainty of their delibera-
tions. In many cases, however, the accountant's ability to charge for 
these third-party benefits is limited. By definition, such parties are not 
in a bargaining arrangement with the accountant and therefore cannot 
be assessed directly for their use of the audit. Hence, the accountant, 
if it is to recapture this benefit, must do so through its charge to the 
client. 
Several factors undercut this strategy. First, except in the Glanzer 
situation, where the audit is commissioned for the direct benefit of a 
specific third party, the accountant often does not know the extent to 
which the client will circulate the audit to third parties. Moreover, the 
client has little incentive to be forthcoming on this score, for it can 
typically reproduce the information contained in the audit at a trivial 
cost, without limit, and without any further assistance by the accoun-
tant.173 Finally, even if the accountant merely estimates the value its 
services provide to third parties, it may be unable to charge its clients 
for such benefits without pricing the audit out of the reach of some of 
these clients. 174 
Under a privity-based liability rule, these recapture problems are of 
little real significance to an accounting firm. It may not be able to 
charge third parties for the benefit they receive for an accurate audit, 
but it is not responsible for the losses they suffer when the audit is 
inaccurate due to the accountant's negligence. But if the accountant is 
charged with the costs that befall such free-riding third parties, as the 
reform courts propose, the accountant's inability to capture the full 
social benefit of its information-producing activities may force it sim-
ply to curtail the production of information in order to bring costs in 
line with revenues. Worse yet, this contraction of auditing services is 
likely to occur, as it does in the psychiatrist example above, with re-
spect to those clients who pose the greatest risk of harm to, or have the 
most extensive dealings with, third parties. 175 
useful activity. See R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMICS 410-13 (1988); Landes & 
Posner, supra note 71. 
173. See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 173-74, 174 N.E. 441, 442 (1931); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1977) (emphasizing the extent to which 
information contained in the audit may be expected to be circulated). 
174. This depends on the elasticity of demand for accounting services. See text at notes 197-
99 infra. 
175. This might be a positive development if the absence of an audit flatly precluded such 
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In short, given the nonappropriable benefits of the auditing pro-
cess, the level of information produced under a liability rule based on 
foreseeability of harm may be less than a socially optimal level. 176 
Thus viewed, Cardozo's fear in Ultramares of creating liability "in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate 
class"177 can be recast as a concern over the negative impact that en-
hanced liability might have on the market for information. This is not 
to suggest that the Ultramares rule generates optimal levels of infor-
mation of an optimal quality. Negligent errors in audits occur, and 
when they do, reliant third parties bear the costs. 178 Given the imper-
fections in the market for information noted above, however, an opti-
mal solution may be elusive, if not impossible. Instead, the choice may 
be between a broad liability rule that emphasizes informational quality 
and a restrained liability rule that emphasizes information production. 
Jurisprudence in the first amendment area has long struggled with 
similar tradeoffs between quality and output;179 it may well be that in 
a situation where the potential victims of inaccurate information are 
equipped to guard against injury, the law should opt for the robust, 
though potentially flawed, production of information. 180 
parties from attracting credit or investment and if society could be certain that consequent exit of 
this class of clients from the market was a net social benefit. Neither condition, however, is 
satisfied. While the absence of an audit may raise the client's cost of credit, such parties often 
can obtain funds without an audit. In such cases, the categorical withholding of auditing services 
from high-risk clients simply decreases third-party information with respect to such transactions. 
In addition, the strategic withdrawal of accounting services in response to the reform courts' 
expanded liability regime does not represent a conclusion that high-risk clients, as a class, create 
social costs that exceed the benefits they generate. Rather, it reflects a simple and less telling 
judgment that the aggregate costs of the accountant's involvement with such parties are likely to 
exceed the benefits the accountant is able to capture in audit fees. 
176. See generally, Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.), cert. 
denied, 108 s. Ct. 775 (1988); K. ARROW, EssAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 151, 183 
(1971); Bishop, Negligent Misrepresentation Through Economists' Eyes, 96 L.Q. REV. 360, 364-66 
(1980). 
177. 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. 
178. Some such errors, of course, might occur even in an optimal regime. Nonetheless, the 
risk-utility calculus of a privity regime, because it excludes consideration of both the risks and 
the benefits to third parties, is unlikely to reach the same equilibrium as would a regime capable 
of weighing all such benefits and costs. 
179. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The first amendment implica-
tions of judicial regulation of the accountant's work product are beyond the scope of this article. 
For an insightful introduction to the general area, see Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Eco-
nomic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 
1212 (1983). 
180. See Perlman, supra note 80, at 74 ("[T]he need for limits [on tort liability] is acute when 
tortious behavior consists of utterances, because society places a high value on free speech. To 
the extent that uncertain or overbroad liability causes a speaker to take precautionary steps to 
avoid liability, the establishment of some limits is imperative."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 552 comment a (1977) (restrictions on accountant liability necessary to promote "the 
important social policy of encouraging the flow of commercial information upon which the oper-
ation of the economy rests"). 
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Indeed, the reform courts' preference for information quality over 
information quantity may be of little value to the third-party creditors 
and investors the reform effort is intended to protect. Given that the 
promised response of the accounting profession to third-party liability 
exposure will be to limit their auditing function to "safe" compa-
nies, 181 rather than to audit all companies more thoroughly, overall 
third-party protection may decline rather than improve. Firms that 
would benefit most from an independent audit - because they are 
young or small or unstructured - may be denied such services on the 
ground that they pose excessive audit risks. 182 The traditional credi-
tors and investors involved with such enterprises are therefore left 
with no audit protection, rather than the admittedly imperfect protec-
tion they enjoyed under the traditional privity rule. At the same time, 
the more thorough audits conducted on the remaining auditable com-
panies may afford little additional protection to third parties, since 
such firms qualified for audits by virtue of their already lower audit 
risk. 
Furthermore, to the extent that the audit plays an important role 
in commerce, and particularly in the access of firms to the capital mar-
kets, 183 increasing audit cost or decreasing audit availability may pro-
duce substantial barriers to the growth of firms that can no longer 
afford or qualify for accounting services. Just as the extensive disclo-
sure requirements of the federal securities laws have been criticized as 
an unnecessarily burdensome restriction on the ability of emerging 
firms to enter the capital markets, 184 the "improved" audit envisioned 
by the reform courts may be an entry ticket that too few can afford. 
Thus, even if the enhanced liability imposed by the reform courts does 
improve audit safety, it does so at a potentially significant cost to new 
business growth. 
In sum, despite the reform courts' unquestioning faith in the utility 
of enhanced deterrence, it is far from clear that the benefits of aban-
doning the privity defense exceed the costs. The question is both ex-
181. See text accompanying notes 150-53 supra. Of course, the profession's reaction is un-
likely to be monolithic. Some accounting firms will doubtless be willing to provide auditing 
services to high-risk clients in return for enhanced compensation. And such clients to some 
extent may be able to recapture the benefits of such audits in the form of lower costs of raising 
capital. But, given the imperfections of the market for auditing services suggested above, it re-
mains unclear whether the net changes in the cost and availability of audit services enhance 
social welfare. 
182. See Minow, supra note 16, at 80. 
183. See Fischel, supra note 126. 
184. See, e.g., Manne, Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities 
Laws, in WALL STREET IN TRANsmoN 23 (H. Manne & E. Solomon eds. 1974); Easterbrook & 
Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 671 (1984). 
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ceedingly complex and largely empirical. In many ways, the necessary 
inquiry regarding the value of proposed reforms appears to parallel 
that which a court makes in assessing the reasonableness of a product 
design in the face of a claim that the design is defective. Here, the 
"product" is a liability rule itself - privity-based negligence - and 
before a court concludes that the rule is defective, it should determine 
with some confidence that a proposed design change - abrogating 
privity - will yield social benefits that exceed the rule's costs. Others 
have expressed profound skepticism about the rationality of such in-
quiries even when the product is simply a product, 185 but when the 
product under design scrutiny is an entire liability regime, the correct 
resolution of the calculus may be well beyond the law's information-
gathering and problem-solving abilities. 186 At the very least, the net 
value of enhanced deterrence in the accounting cases is a dangerous 
issue to eyeball, or, even worse, to assume as given. 
Of course, a proponent of the reforms might respond that the same 
uncertainties also plague the type of reform Cardozo sanctioned in 
MacPherson. This is true, but it overlooks a critical distinction be-
tween what the law must do and what the law might do. In cases like 
MacPherson and Henningsen, tort law perceived a failure of private 
arrangements regarding product risk. Against this backdrop of de-
fault, the "needs of life in a developing civilization" compelled the in-
tervention of law. 187 The exact extent and configuration of the 
intervention may not have been perfect, but few questioned its neces-
sity.188 The reform efforts in the accounting cases, in contrast, are 
based not on the failure of private arrangements but on the raw prom-
ise of instrumentalism. Enhanced deterrence is no longer an outcome 
of the rule change, but instead is the reason for the change. Bravado 
replaces caution, but with it comes the right to insist on a better qual-
ity of proof. In the negligent accounting cases, that proof is simply 
lacking. In the resulting silence of questions unanswered, tort law 
stands embarrassed. 
B. The Loss-Bearing Rationale 
In addition to increasing the incentives to take care, the reform 
courts assume that shifting the risk of loss from the third parties to 
185. See, e.g., Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The 
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1971). 
186. See Siliciano, supra note 4, at 1860-63. 
187. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 391, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916). 
188. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 3 (discussing widespread support for an expanded products 
liability regime). 
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accountants will serve a second major element of instrumental tort 
theory: improving society's loss-bearing capacity. Accepting a certain 
level of loss as inevitable, 189 the underlying goal of this strand of in-
strumental theory is to identify the actors in the risk-producing trans-
action who, regardless of fault, are best suited institutionally to 
manage the loss. 190 As one reform court asked, "Isn't the risk of loss 
more easily distributed and fairly spread by imposing it on the ac-
counting profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against the 
risk onto its customers, ,who can in turn pass the cost onto the entire 
consuming public?"19 1 Such rhetorical questions tend to prompt 
quick and affirmative replies, and hence most commentators have eas-
ily accepted the loss-spreading justification for reform. 192 Some hesi-
tation is appropriate, however, for the decision to embrace loss-
bearing as a rationale raises important theoretical and practical 
concerns. 
1. Theoretical Concerns 
On an abstract level, one might question why the instrumental goal 
of efficient loss-bearing has any place in a debate where negligence 
seemingly is assumed by both the privity and nonprivity jurisdictions 
to be the basis for liability. The loss-bearing rationale has traditionally 
been associated almost exclusively with strict liability, and for good 
reason; under a negligence regime, the accountant should be free from 
liability for residual losses once it has taken reasonable care. 193 To 
impose liability after this point would require accepting that the risk 
189. As discussed below, the reform courts are quite imprecise in discussing this rationale. 
Terms such as "risks," "costs" and "losses" are used interchangeably, and with little explana-
tion. This article assumes that the reform courts mean this instrumental justification for reform 
to be independent of the deterrence rationale in which accident losses are shifted to the accoun-
tant (le., internalized) in order to create economic incentives for care. It may well be, however, 
that the reform courts are simply parroting rhetoric common in the defective products context, 
an area to which they draw strong parallels, without truly distinguishing between deterrence and 
Joss-bearing rationales. 
190. Hence, a traditional justification for preferring strict liability over negligence, despite 
the theoretical capacity of both regimes to generate the same optimal level of care, is the greater 
capacity of producers relative to consumers to manage the residual accident costs that would 
occur despite optimal care. See generally Priest, supra note 3. · 
191. Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.I. 1968). See also International 
Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Acct. Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 820, 227 Cal. Rptr. 218, 227 
(1986) ("The risk of such loss is more appropriately placed on the accounting profession which is 
better able to pass such risk to its customers and the ultimate consuming public."); Rosenblum, 
Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 350, 461A.2d138, 152 (1983) (costs of third-party claims should be 
"borne by the business entity and its stockholders or its customers"); Citizens State Bank v. 
Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 384, 335 N.W.2d 361, 365 (1984) ("Accountants may 
spread the risk through the use of liability insurance."). 
192. See pro-reform authorities cited in notes 43 and 50 supra. 
193. See Landes & Posner, supra note 136, at 541-43. 
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producer was both non-negligent and still liable. Of course, in the 
products area, this is precisely what has occurred; instrumental theo-
ries of efficient loss-spreading have been used to justify shifting respon-
sibility for such residual losses to the producer despite its optimal 
investment in care. In so doing, however, courts were required to sub-
stitute strict liability for negligence. 194 But if negligence is to remain 
the standard in the accounting area, and no court has seriously sug-
gested otherwise, 195 it is hard to identify precisely the losses to which 
the loss-spreading rationale attaches. To be sure, there may be losses 
that occur when the accountant fails to invest optimally in care, but 
these are obviously more appropriately treated under a deterrence 
rationale. 196 
Thus, the reform goal of efficient loss spreading may be senseless 
redundancy that collapses back into the deterrence-based issue of 
whether accountants under a privity regime produce excessive, and 
avoidable, accident costs. But if the reform courts mean to do more 
than this - and their analyses are simply too cursory to tell - then 
they are embarked on a remarkable transformation of this area of tort 
law. Not only is foreseeability replacing privity as the basis of liability, 
but the foundations are being built for a supplanting of negligence by 
strict liability. If these courts have indeed determined that accoun-
tants, not for any fault-based reasons but simply because of their insti-
tutional competence and placement, can be called upon to serve the 
collective whole by managing the losses that would otherwise fall else-
where, such a conclusion needs both to be made explicit and to be 
squared against the arguments that have traditionally insulated the 
professions from the increasing dominance of strict liability. 
2. Practical Concerns 
The reform courts' loss-spreading rationale also raises practical 
concerns on several levels. First, the rationale is predicated on an em-
pirical assumption the reform courts never substantiate - the ac-
countant's actual ability to pass its third-party liability costs on to its 
clients. The structure of the accounting profession and the market for 
accounting services, however, may well interact in a manner that 
debilitates effective loss spreading. 
194. See id. at 549-50; Shavell, supra note 168, at 2-3. 
195. Indeed, even academics have been reluctant to propose strict liability for professionals. 
But see Vandall, Applying Strict Liability to Professionals: Economic and Legal Analysis, 59 IND. 
L.J. 25 (1983). 
196. There also may be "losses" which occur when errors in the adjudicatory process cause 
non-negligent conduct to be labelled as negligent. Such liabilities, however, do not constitute the 
kind of exogenous loss that is the focus of risk-spreading rationales. 
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The losses to third parties that the reform courts seek to redistrib-
ute through the expanded liability regime initially appear as an addi-
tional cost of business to the accountant. The accountant's effort to 
recoup such costs through higher service charges to clients, however, 
naturally creates incentives at the margin for such clients to substitute 
away from such services. This substitution effect is likely to be rela-
tively trivial with respect to the limited number of accounting firms 
that specialize in auditing large, publicly held companies. Because the 
securities laws effectively mandate that such businesses obtain audited 
financial stateJD.ents, the ability of such businesses to decline auditing 
services in light of higher accountant fees is severely limited. 
But for the numerically larger group of smaller, younger, and less 
public enterprises - which objectively might benefit most from audit 
services - the tendency to forgo such services rather than pay higher 
fees is likely to be more pronounced. In order to preserve their con-
sumer base, accounting firms may seek to absorb a portion of the in-
creased costs.197 Unfortunately, the segment of the accounting 
profession that services this subgroup of consumers is itself dominated 
by smaller, less established firms that, on the whole, are probably less 
capable of handling such cost increases than the firms that audit large 
public enterprises.198 As a consequence, some marginal accounting 
firms may be eliminated from the market as the demand for auditing 
services contracts.199 
True loss spreading, therefore, may occur only with part of the 
profession and its client base. The social benefits of loss spreading, 
however, may· be more than offset by the decreased consumption of 
audit services by those clients that might benefit most from such ser-
vices and by the elimination of some accounting firms that might 
otherwise service this segment of the market. While these questions, 
of course, are ultimately empirical, there is little basis for the reform 
courts' simplistic, trouble-free model of loss spreading. 
Moreover, even if effective loss spreading is assumed, the need to 
197. See generally Comment, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 335, 350-52 (1985). If this effect is suffi-
ciently pronounced, the loss-spreading rationale is defeated; third-party losses are concentrated 
on a segment of the accounting profession rather than dispersed through its consumer base. 
Indeed, under such circumstances, a pure loss-spreading rationale might argue in favor of leaving 
losses on the more numerous class of third-party audit consumers. 
198. In economic terms, the numerous individuals and small firms that populate this segment 
of the accounting profession are likely to make this portion of the market more competitive than 
is the relatively concentrated segment that services large, publicly held companies. Conse-
quently, most firms will be earning only normal profits and will be unable to absorb the addi-
tional liability costs of a foreseeability-based rule. 
199. See Note, Protecting the Auditor from Unwarranted Third-Party Liability: Rethinking 
the Indemnification Issue, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 763, 764 n.7 (1984) (reporting that some ac-
counting firms are forced out of the market due to increased third-party liability costs). 
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use the accountant for such purposes is debatable. In importing the 
loss-spreading rationale into the domain of negligent accounting, the 
reform courts attempt to invoke instrumentalism's vision of the single 
injured consumer, who is unable to bear the potentially staggering 
costs of a product-related injury, and the large product manufacturer, 
who can easily cover such costs through insurance and incremental 
increases in product prices. Although this powerful image' fueled the 
development of strict liability regimes for defective products,200 the 
effort of the reform courts to transpose it to the accounting context 
again ignores the third party's true nature. Like the accountant, the 
typical third party in the accounting cases is a commercial concern 
with multiple business relationships.201 Thus, to some extent, it shares 
the accountant's ability to spread, throughout its consumer base, the 
costs it incurs when one of its customers defaults on a loan obtained 
with the use of a defective audit. 
If losses can be spread widely in either direction, the products lia-
bility analogy once again collapses. Why, then, should the reform 
courts, in the absence of overriding fault-based reasons, place the loss-
spreading function on the accountant rather than on the third party, 
where the loss would otherwise naturally fall? The only answer pro-
vided is the fear that under the latter loss-spreading mechanism, "the 
cost of credit to the general public will increase because creditors will 
either have to absorb the costs of bad loans made in reliance on faulty 
information or hire independent accountants to verify the information 
received."202 
Yet, this answer, if anything, only emphasizes the parallelism of 
the alternative means of spreading the losses caused by the client's 
circulation of inaccurate information. Both potential loss spreaders -
the accountant and the third party - can expend resources to mini-
mize the losses incurred; the accountant can attempt to audit more 
thoroughly, while the third party can audit the client independently or 
bear the investment risks. Both actors can theoretically pass on such 
costs, 203 plus any residual losses, to the public: the accountant, 
through increases in the cost of its services; and the third party, 
through increases in the cost of its credit. Either way, the increased 
costs initially are imposed on the client class, which in tum passes it 
200. See Priest, supra note 3. 
201. See text at notes 137-40 supra. 
202. Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 384, 335 N.W.2d 361, 
365 (1984). 
203. As previously noted, the actual ability of an actor to pass on cost increases will depend 
on the elasticity of demand for the actor's product and the competitiveness of the market in 
which the actor operates. See note 198 and accompanying text supra. 
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on to the public in the form of price increases. Inexplicably, the re-
form courts view one path as good and one as bad. Using the accoun-
tant as a vehicle to impose the costs on the "entire consuming public" 
is apparently sound policy, 204 while imposing the same costs on "the 
general public" through increases in the price of third-party credit is 
not.205 The logic of this dichotomy is, to say the least, not readily 
apparent. 206 
Of course, not all third parties are positioned to spread such losses. 
In particular, individual investors who rely on a defective audit have 
no real ability to redistribute the loss widely across society. For sev-
eral reasons, however, enlisting the accountant to redistribute such 
losses may be unwise. First, as noted above, such investors may suffer 
rather than benefit if accountants constrict their activity in response to 
enhanced liability.207 Second, such investors can limit the impact of 
such losses simply by diversifying their range of investments. 208 Fi-
nally, such investors, as a class, represent a broad social base upon 
which the costs of accounting errors can be spread. The question 
therefore becomes why this portion of the populace - the "investing 
public" - is entitled, absent fault-based reasons, to have its losses 
lifted, aggregated, and transferred by the tort system to the "general 
public" that consumes the products and services of the accountant's 
clients. This is a troubling question, and one the reform courts never 
address. 209 
IV. WHITHER TORT? 
The above analysis does not demonstrate that Cardozo was right 
and the reform courts are wrong. That is not its goal. Instead, the 
effort here is a more modest one: to show that the case for abandoning 
Ultramares and embracing a foreseeability-based concept of liability 
has not yet been made, and that caution therefore is in order. One 
204. Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.I. 1986). 
205. Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis. 2d at 384, 335 N.W.2d at 365. 
206. Indeed, since the costs under either scenario ultimately pass on to the client population 
that consumes accounting services and third-party credit, the most significant difference between 
the two loss-spreading models may be the higher litigation costs that occur when the third party 
is allowed to transfer its losses to the accountant under the Rosenblum approach. 
207. See text at notes 181-82 supra. 
208. See generally R. HAUGEN, MODERN INVESTMENT THEORY 52-74 (1986). Indeed, 
many such investors use mutual funds, which effectively diversify their investment risk. 
209. Indeed, the transfer of residual losses from the class of investors and creditors upon 
which such losses initially fall to the "general consuming public" might usefully be analyzed in 
economic terms as an instance of rent-seeking behavior. See, e.g., Macey, Transaction Costs and 
the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 
VA. L. REV. 471 (1988). 
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might naturally have hoped for a firmer conclusion - one asserting 
that privity, or its antithesis, is clearly preferable. But a fundamental 
sub-theme of this article - that an instrumental analysis, properly ex-
ecuted, involves a complex, heavily empirical, and potentially open-
ended inquiry - humbles any quest for definitive answers. 
Perhaps the best solution, if such a thing exists, lies somewhere in 
the uncomfortable terrain between a fiat privity rule and a full-blown 
foreseeability test for liability. The Glanzer rule, or some derivation of 
it, may strike a crude but workable accommodation between these 
poles. Although the reform courts find rules based on actual foresight 
rather than reasonable foreseeability of harm to be indefensible, such 
rules address some of the major substantive issues discussed above. 
They give tort law a greater role in policing the conduct of accoun-
tants than would a pure privity requirement, but nonetheless contain 
liability in a manner consistent with the economic loss doctrine. 
Moreover, they partially shift the losses generated by negligent ac-
counting, but - because they allow the accountant to gauge its expo-
sure accurately in advance - such rules do not seriously impair the 
insurance function. 
Such a conclusion is only offered tentatively, for it may be too diffi-
cult and too costly, from a purely process perspective, to maintain a 
line in this interstitial area. The precise formulation of the original 
Glanzer exception - that the end and aim of the transaction was to 
benefit a specifically foreseen third party - is indefensible on substan-
tive grounds. Why must there be only one end and aim of the transac-
tion? Why can't the rule protect a class of foreseen third parties? And 
since the identity of some members of such a class is unknown to the 
accountant, isn't the actual rule really one of foreseeability? There are 
no obvious answers to these questions; if they are taken seriously and 
addressed in substantive terms, the drift from Ultramares to Rosen-
blum may be inevitable. Only if tort law refuses to address such in-
quiries, and accepts the arbitrariness of the exact placement of the line, 
can this substantively useful middle ground be held.210 
210. Alternatively, one might consider a stratified negligence rule that accounts for the vary-
ing ability of third parties to implement their preferences through private ordering. Thus, so-
phisticated investors and creditors might be required to fend for themselves, perhaps even to the 
extent of retracting the protection they traditionally enjoyed under the various formulations of 
the Glanzer rule. See generally Goldberg, supra note SO, at 302. Remote, unsophisticated inves-
tors, on the other hand, might receive the rigorous protection of a pure foreseeability rule. Cf, 
note 143 supra (noting similar stratified approach to investor protection under securities laws). 
The advantage of such an approach is that it targets tort law on situations where its interven-
tion is most useful. The disadvantages of a stratified rule, however, are considerable. It threatens 
considerable litigation costs, since parties who do not qualify for protection presumably will 
remain free to claim that they do and have the issue adjudicated. Moreover, if the steady expan-
sion of the Glanzer exception to Ultramares is any indication, it is doubtful whether common law 
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Thus deflected from any firm conclusion, the focus of this article 
shifts from the failure of the reform courts to improve upon Cardozo's 
handiwork to the reasons for this shortcoming. This inquiry is worth 
pursuing, for the analysis offered by the reform courts seems not only 
to miss the mark, but to do so by a considerable distance. Of course, 
there are obvious dangers in drawing broad conclusions about the di-
rection of instrumental tort reform from an examination of a single 
line of cases. Yet, the absolute identity of reasoning in all the negli-
gent accounting cases - the recurring reference to the products anal-
ogy, the ready resort to deterrence and loss-spreading rationales, and 
the clear preference for a collectivist view of social obligation over one 
based in part upon private ordering - undercuts any contrary claim 
that such decisions are aberrational and unrepresentative. Indeed, the 
same patterns of argument replicate themselves throughout much of 
modern tort law.211 On the reasonable assumption, then, that the ac-
counting cases do in fact reflect major currents within tort law, what 
can be learned from the ongoing dismantling of the accountant's tradi-
tional privity defense? 
The central lesson seems apparent. Despite the laudable intentions 
of the reform courts, their efforts to use instrumental reasoning in as-
sessing the merits of proposed rule changes have remained painfully 
superficial. This is not to suggest that instrumental tort theory itself is 
simplistic, for much of it is plainly quite the opposite.212 But if the 
accounting cases are any indication, the practical ability of courts to 
grasp and work with the nuances and limits of academic theory is 
limited. 
This institutional incompetence manifests itself in a variety of 
ways. To begin with, a fixation with easy analogies and reflexive par-
allelism has taken the place of a careful consideration of how the 
unique attributes and interrelations of parties might affect the choice 
of liability rules. The accountant is equated with the product manu-
facturer, the third party with the "innocent victim" of the defective 
product context, and the audit with a defective product. With the 
roles thus cast, the answer comes easily; indeed, it appears compelled 
courts are capable of resisting piecemeal redefinition of the potential plaintiff class. Finally, the 
resulting complication of the negligence standard may be unwarranted in light of the protection 
most such investors enjoy under the securities laws and are able to supplement through diversifi-
cation of their investment strategies. 
211. See H. STEINER, supra note 105; Schuck, supra note 4. 
212. See, e.g., w. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
(1987); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 
(1972); Calabresi & Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1985); 
Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the 
Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689 (1985); Shavell, supra note 168. 
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by the weight of well-accepted precedents in the products liability 
area. This result further satisfies the reform courts because it tidies the 
law and relieves courts of the doctrinally challenging task of gatekeep-
ing for the citadel of privity. By simply withholding the defense for 
one and all, the law is, in the courts' view, made simple, clear, and 
modern.213 But, as noted above, this effort to remake the accountant 
in the image of the product manufacturer obscures the true character-
istics of the parties and unfairly devalues the potential utility of a 
privity-linked defense in the accounting cases. 
Moreover, the deterrence and loss-bearing rationales that domi-
nate instrumental tort reform have come loose from their historical 
moorings and now drift about in a way that ultimately embarrasses the 
law. Rather than viewing foreseeability as but one of a number of 
potential foundations for a liability rule, the reform courts consider it 
to be a categorical imperative. This leads such courts to promise far 
more than they seem able, as a practical matter, to deliver. For, while 
it is quite easy to say that we are all each other's keeper, it is consider-
ably harder to show that the overall social welfare is advanced by al-
ways defining legal obligation so broadly. That the reform courts have 
not even attempted such a showing, but have instead simply assumed 
the value of enhanced accountant liability, is therefore particularly 
troubling. 
Similarly, the loss-bearing rationale seems completely out of place 
in a negligence regime where all the actors are well integrated into the 
web of commerce. Negligence, by definition, leaves residual losses 
where they fall. But even if there were losses in the accounting cases 
in need of spreading, a dispassionate analysis might easily conclude 
that third parties ·generally are in the best position to manage and 
spread such losses. Yet, once again, the blind force of the products 
analogy preempts such a conclusion. 
Finally, instrumental tort reform has developed an unhealthy and 
unrealistic dependence on the mythical powers of insurance. Not only 
does this faith in insurance undergird the courts' loss-bearing ratio-
nale, but it also serves as a universal apologia for any adverse conse-
quences that might flow from the reform effort. Rosenblum, for 
example, scoffs at Ultramares' concern over the financial viability of 
accountants in a world without privity, noting that there is "no reason 
to believe" that insurance would not alleviate the burden of increased 
third-party liability.214 At the same time, the court declined to enter-
213. See note 113 supra and accompanying text. 
214. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 349, 461 A.2d 138, 151. 
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tain seriously the defendant accountants' argument that, given the dy-
namics of insurance, broad coverage for third-party claims might be 
unavailable or prohibitively expensive. 215 But such concerns are real 
and deserve to be addressed by any court that sets itself the task of 
determining "what duty the auditor should bear to best serve the pub-
lic interest."216 
These related qualms about the direction of modern tort law raise 
a broader concern about the viability of instrumental reasoning as an 
independent, self-sustaining basis for reform. Although most formal 
instrumental theory eschews dependence on vague notions of fair-
ness,217 the accounting cases suggest that the successful application of 
these complex concepts may depend heavily on how their outcome 
correlates with rough perceptions of what is just or fair.218 Contrast, 
for a moment, the accounting cases with products liability - the area 
where instrumental tort theory is generally considered to have enjoyed 
its greatest success. 
In the products area, few question the utility of instrumental theo-
ries of deterrence and loss spreading. Imposing accident costs on pro-
ducers should, at least in theory, encourage optimal levels of care and 
production.219 And, to the extent that loss spreading is accepted as a 
rationale,220 the product manufacturer is generally considered to be 
better equipped than the individual consumer to manage and spread 
accident costs. Yet, in cases like MacPherson, Henningsen, and Green-
215. In response to the defendants' claim, the court observed: "Suffice it to say that defen-
dants have not alerted us to data either within or outside the record to support this position." 
Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 349 n.11, 461 A.2d at 151 n.11. This answer, however, is not sufficient. 
Rosenblum dramatically expanded the potential liability of accountants, so at the time of the 
decision there could be no "data" establishing the impact of the decision on the insurance mar-
kets. By the same token, existing data showing the availability of insurance under privity-based 
regimes were rendered irrelevant by the decision. 
216. 93 N.J. at 334, 461 A.2d at 142. 
217. But see Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Fletcher, 
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972). 
218. No attempt is made here to tackle the daunting task of outlining a non-instrumental, 
fairness-based component of tort Jaw. Some efforts have been made in this direction, see, e.g., 
Fletcher, supra note 217, but considerable debate continues on the scope and utility of this alter-
native, normative approach to tort Jaw. See generally Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and 
Private Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 681 (1985). The point here is a simpler, more descriptive one: 
courts, in attempting to justify the expansion of liability rules on instrumental grounds, often 
seek to bolster their argument through use of a subtext based on fairness concerns. And, if the 
negligent accounting cases are representative, the success of instrumentalist argument and its 
fairness counterpart may stand or fall together. For a detailed and thoughtful argument along 
similar lines, see H. STEINER, supra note 105 (arguing that courts' "social vision" concerning the 
actors in the tort system undergirds and supplements their use of doctrine and justificatory 
argument). 
219. See Landes & Posner, supra note 136. 
220. Recent scholarship has raised significant questions about the utility of this rationale in 
promoting social welfare. See Priest, supra note 4. 
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man, these instrumental themes do not stand alone. Instead, they are 
accompanied by strands of argument based on notions of fairness. The 
producer is cast as powerful and responsible, while the consumer is 
characterized as innocent and largely helpless. For most, these por-
trayals seem appropriate, and thus instrumental theory works in har-
mony with intuitive notions of the just outcome. 
In the accounting cases, both lines of argument are again present. 
But interestingly, when one pushes the analysis, both the instrumental 
and the fairness arguments seem more strained. The instrumental jus-
tifications for reform offered by the courts are in reality little more 
than ritualistic incantations of the concepts of deterrence and loss 
bearing, with little or no substance to their application. Perhaps to 
redress this deficiency, the courts repeatedly invoke the fairness meta-
phor of the products context, but their effort to paint the third party as 
a sympathetic victim and the accountant as a heedless risk-taker sim-
ply rings false. Viewing the complex interrelation between accoun-
tant, client, and third party objectively, one is almost always hard 
pressed to find the underdog. Thus, the concept of fairness, even 
though unquestionably vague .and frustratingly subjective, may be a 
crude but useful proxy for identifying situations where reform of tort 
law is appropriate.221 
Admittedly, the suggested correlation in these two contexts be-
tween the success of instrumental tort reasoning and the presence of 
intuitive notions of fairness may be spurious. A broader sampling is 
obviously required. But such a relationship, if established, would sug-
gest a much more modest role for instrumental tort reform. Specifi-
cally, absent strong concerns about the unfairness of existing rules and 
the nonviability of private ordering soliitions, tort courts should hesi-
tate to expand liability rules on instrumental grounds alone. In such 
cases, the absence of clear villains and victims may signal a complexity 
of social interaction that does not yield easily to the relatively crude 
instrumental reasoning that unfortunately characterizes much of mod-
em tort reform. 
Finally, one might question whether the reform courts can now 
learn to stay their hand. The instrumental ideology of modem tort 
law is clearly empowering. Gone is the reticence of Cardozo, and with 
it the process-based notion that major alterations of liability rules, "if 
expedient, must be wrought by legislation. "222 In its place is a confi-
221. Cf H. STEINER, supra note 105, at 93 ("it is the fusion of some vision of society with 
some ideal of right or fairness or welfare that enables us to describe in any detail any one justifi· 
catory theory"). 
222. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 187, 174 N.E. 441, 447 (1931). 
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dence and sense of mission that compels each of the reform courts, in 
concluding its analysis of the privity issue, to pronounce that the 
"public interest" has been well served by the work it has done that 
day. 223 To be sure, several of these courts formally recognize in pass-
ing that "policy factors" might, at some point, curtail the expansion of 
liability that is compelled by the choice of foreseeability as a proxy for 
duty.224 Yet no real effort to explore such constraints has yet occurred 
in the accounting cases, 225 suggesting that any limitations on instru-
mental tort reform perceived by such courts are few and still far off. 
This judicial confidence is hardly surprising. Most of the concepts 
of enhanced deterrence and improved risk spreading that underlie in-
strumental tort reform first appeared in tort scholarship, 226 and thus 
the academy has been both quick to applaud judicial efforts to imple-
ment such theories and quick to suggest further directions for reform. 
Indeed, like veterans recalling past campaigns, the scholarship sup-
porting the reform courts' abolition of the accountant's privity defense 
uniformly likens such efforts to the bold inroads cases like MacPher-
son, Henningsen, and Greenman v. Yuba Prods. Inc. made against the 
traditional defenses of product manufacturers. 227 
Amidst this mutual admiration among the courts and some of the 
scholars that comprise the instrumental reform movement in tort law, 
the superficial character of the arguments supporting specific reforms 
continues to go unnoticed. Opposing cases are seldom discussed, 
scholarly authority is tapped selectively, and the legitimate policy ar-
223. See, e.g., text at note 58 supra. 
224. For example, the Wisconsin court in Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co. con-
cluded that privity was no longer available to accountants as a defense to third-party negligence 
actions "unless, under the facts of this particular case, as a matter of policy to be decided by the 
court, recovery is denied." 113 Wis. 2d 376, 386, 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (1984). The court sug-
gested that this inquiry might include (1) whether the injury is too remote from the negligence, 
(2) whether liability is wholly out of proportion to the accountant's culpability, (3) whether in 
retrospect it appears "too highly extraordinary" that the accountant's negligence should have 
caused the plaintiff's harm, (4) whether recovery might place an excessive burden on the accoun-
tant, (5) whether recovery might encourage fraudulent claims, or (6) whether allowing recovery 
might have "no sensible or just stopping point." 113 Wis. 2d at 387, 335 N.W.2d at 366. The 
court, however, declined to explain or apply any of these criteria, noting instead that a determi-
nation specific to the individual defendant in the case could best be made "after the facts of [the] 
case have been fully explored at trial." 113 Wis. 2d at 387, 335 N.W.2d at 366. 
225. For example, although the Wisconsin court in Citizens State Bank suggests some policy 
reasons for protecting accountants against third-party liability, it concludes that any such claims 
can be raised at trial by defendants. 113 Wis. 2d at 387, 335 N.W.2d at 366. The court's refusal 
to discuss or apply such constraints except on a case-by-case basis, however, essentially compels 
accountants to assume ex ante the existence of a nonprivity regime. Thus, all the potential nega-
tive consequences of the rule change discussed above flow from the decision, despite the court's 
apparent acknowledgment that some policy factors may militate against the rule in specific cases. 
226. See Priest, supra note 3. 
227. See note 50 supra. 
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guments of those subject to the new rules are treated with derision. In 
essence, a new citadel has been raised by the would-be heirs of those 
who long ago successfully stormed the privity defense for defective 
products. Like its antithesis, however, this citadel of modem tort re-
form seemingly seeks to lay claim to more of tort law than it can suc-
cessfully defend. One can hope that it too will find its hegemony 
challenged. 
